CHAPTER 21

ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA AND THE RISE OF EUROPEAN COLONIAL EMPIRES

Outside of Sudanic Africa and the Guinean regions, the third major zone of Muslim population in Africa is the region of the eastern Sudan, the East African coasts, and the hinterlands of Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Kenya. The principles behind the diffusion of Islam and the organization of Muslim societies in these regions were much the same as those of West Africa, but the sources of Islamic influences were primarily Egypt, Arabia, and the Indian Ocean region, rather than North Africa. Also, the circumstances in which East African Islamic societies were organized were different. This chapter will conclude with an overview of the establishment of European colonial empires and the partition of Muslim Africa.

SUDAN

The history of the eastern Sudan (the modern state of Sudan) evolved separately from that of the central and western Sudan owing to the fact that Islam reached the eastern Sudan from Egypt rather than from North Africa. Also, in the eastern Sudan a mass Islamic society was established at a relatively early date.

The Arabs occupied Egypt as far as Aswan in 641, but it was many centuries before Arab and Muslim peoples penetrated Nubia and the Sudanic belt to the south. The first Arab influx occurred in the ninth century, when Egyptians swarmed south to the newly discovered Allaqi gold fields between the Nile and the Red Sea. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Arab Bedouin migrations increased the Muslim presence. Arabs married into local families as
through matrilineral succession their children inherited local chieftainships. Arab penetration was followed by the Mamluk conquest of Nubia. In 1317 the church of Dongola was re-dedicated as a mosque. Most of the country, however, was in the hands of local Arab tribal chiefs, who continued to push south. While Arabs were pushing south, herding peoples from the region of the Blue Nile called Funi were putting north. The first historically known Funi ruler, Amara Dumnah, defeated the Christian kingdom of Alwa in 1504, and founded Sinnar at the capital of a Funi kingdom which reached north to the third cataract, south to the foothills of Ethiopia and east to the desert of Kordofan. The new Funi state, bordering on Arab-Muslim populations to the north, had an interest in facilitating trade with Egypt; its rulers had been converted to Islam, and used Arabic as the lingua franca of trade, though the court at Sinnar continued to speak Funi. Only in the eighteenth century did state documents in Arabic appear.

The Funi monarchy was a patrimonial regime built upon a Sudanese concept of semi-divine kingship. The public appearance of the Sultans was accompanied by pomp and ceremony, but Funi rulers spent most of their reigns secluded from public view. The ruler was in principle absolute but in practice very much under the sway of his ministers, courtiers, and family. Provincial nobles lived in castles supported by their own slave retainers. A provincial lord placed each village in his jurisdiction under the supervision of an experienced slave in order to exact taxes. Provincial nobles, however, had to appear before the Sultan each year to perform obeisance, account for their behavior, and deliver tribute. Each lesser lord was also required to take a wife from the royal family so that every vassal was related to the ruler. The ruling community formed a caste-like group which avoided intermarriage with the local population.

The Funi kingdom depended for its economic visibility on the gold trade. All gold mined within the kingdom belonged to the Sultan, who was also the organizer of long-distance commerce. As trade expanded and foreign merchant communities in Sinnar grew larger, it became increasingly difficult to enforce the Sultan’s trading monopoly. By 1700, with the introduction of coinage, an unrestrained market system took hold and royal control over commerce evaporated.

Islam spread in the Funi Sultanate not only as the result of its acceptance by the governing elite and the trading communities, but as the result of the migration of Muslim scholars and holy-men into the region. In the sixteenth century Funi patronage attracted scholars from Upper Egypt, North Africa, and Arabia. These holy-men, known locally as fagis, were scholars of the Quran and Muslim law and Sufi mystics and magicians. The fagis gained considerable influence because they could intercede with and even rebank the rulers, and because they were venerated by the common people for their magical powers. The fagis founded lineages, settled in villages, established schools, and won the populace over to Islam. Their zawiya were residences and places of prayer in which the holy-men lived surrounded by their families, servants, and disciples. Their schools (khutubs) taught young boys the Quran, law, and Muslim theology. In time the zawiya grew into colonies and villages in which leading descendants of the original holy-men maintained a spiritual or temporal authority. They administered Malikite law, arbitrated local disputes, and instructed the people in Islam. The eastern Sudanese fagis were also part of the Sufi brotherhoods. The Shaikhuliya was brought into the Sudan in the fifteenth century, the Qadiriya in the middle of the sixteenth, and the Majdubul sport in the eighteenth century.

After a long and fruitful history, the Funi kingdom disintegrated in the eighteenth century. The system of marriage alliances and princely hostages upon which the power of the state depended broke down; local dynasties became autonomous. The Sultans lost control of trade to a new merchant middle class. At the same time civil wars forced the peasants to look to the holy-men for protection and the Sultans lost the peasant population to the fagis. Together, the autonomy of provincial vassals, merchant communities, and fagis and their peasant clients subverted the power of the Funi Sultanate. The Funi kingdom was finally brought to an end by the Egyptian conquest of 1820–21, which introduced a new state administration and new Islamic religious tendencies. These will be considered in Part III.

The Arabization and Islamization of Funi was followed by the spread of Islam and the formation of kingdoms further south and west. In Darfur, the Keira lineage of the Fur peoples established a new dynasty in the late sixteenth century and a small multi-ethnic state. The Keira state inherited Sudanic concepts of divine kingship; the daily life of the ruler was circumscribed by rituals of pagan origin. Between 1660 and 1680 Sulayman made Islam the royal cult, built mosques, and added Shari’a principles to his claims to legitimacy. Arabic became the language of the chancery; Fur remained the spoken language of the court.

At the end of the eighteenth century ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid (1785/7–1800/1) consolidated the Darfur Sultanate around a palace complex called al-Fashir. Al-Fashir was the hub of administration, a training ground for officers
and courtiers, a center for the redistribution of goods, a final court of justice, and a stage for festivals, ceremonies, and parades. The Keira dynasty ruled their Fur subjects through a centralized administrative hierarchy, but their non-Fur subjects, the majority of the population, were divided into four provinces ruled by local chieftains. In the late eighteenth century the central government attempted to replace the traditional territorial leaders with the Sultan's slaves and clients, including merchants and Muslim holy-men. The new elite progressively took control of outlying areas. The rulers also rewarded their retainers with landed estates (hukuru) and slaves. The land grantee, however, made their holdings hereditary, married into the local elites, and emerged as a quasi-independent aristocracy. The Muslim holy-men were particularly successful in consolidating their local power.

The political consolidation of Darfur was accompanied by further Islamization. Through the protection and patronage of the Sultans, and under the stimulus of trade with Egypt, traders and Sufis from the northern Sudan, Egypt, Arabia, and West Africa settled in Darfur. In eastern Darfur Islamic holy-men married local women and opened khalwas and mosques. Young boys left home to study with the faqis and cultivate their fields; they then returned to their homes to further spread the teachings of the faith. These holy-men helped sustain the regime by creating non-tribal communities, and by providing it with legitimizing genealogies and proper Arabic documents. The Sultans did little, however, to create an Islamic judicial administration. Nineteenth-century Sultans also attempted to bring the holy-men under bureaucratic control. After 1858 the faqis were organized district by district under the administration of muqaddas who were responsible for their discipline.

The Islamization of the eastern Sudan to the end of the eighteenth century differed profoundly from that of the western and central Sudan. While Islam in the western Sudan was essentially a royal cult and the religion of trading communities, in the eastern Sudan it was a popular religion.

THE COASTAL CITIES AND SWAHILI ISLAM

On the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean another form of Islamic civilization came into being as a result of the impact of Muslim merchants, teachers, and other settlers upon the indigenous African society. An earlier generation of scholars regarded Swahili East African coastal Islamic society as a colonial society based on the settlement of Arab or Persian migrants among a primitive African population. In the old view the Muslim settlers created cities and absorbed local people into an Arab or Persian Muslim-based culture.

The Swahili language and cultural style was considered the product of the assimilation of Africans into a basically Arab- or Persian-Muslim society. More recent scholarship stresses the indigenous African basis of Swahili civilization. The archeological evidence seems to show an indigenous urban society inhabiting mud and thatched hut settlements with some stone buildings. Most of these settlements were agricultural, probably growing fruit, rice, millet, and cotton, and keeping livestock. A few, on the islands, were oriented to commerce. Some southern towns, like Kilwa, ruled by African chiefs, traded in the Indian Ocean. The rise of an East African Islamic civilization, then, was not so much due to migration, settlement, and the founding of new towns as to contacts among merchants, the transfer of ideas and concepts, and the eventual settlement of Muslim traders.

The first Muslim contacts and settlements occurred in the ninth and tenth centuries on the northern Somali coast and the East African coast. Mogadishu, Merka, and Brava had Muslim populations in this early period. Apart from individuals, there were no Muslim communities on the southern coast before 1100 and very few before 1300. After 1100 the Muslim presence began to expand, stimulated by intensified trade and by Muslim expansion into India and the Indian Ocean region, including the extension of an Egyptian sphere of influence to the Red Sea, Aden, and southwestern Arabia, the conquest of India by Muslims from Afghanistan and Inner Asia, and the conversion of Indonesian coastal peoples. In the twelfth century the first mosques were built; Zanzibar and Pemba became the most important Muslim settlements. Though the sequence is not clear, Muslim migrants came from the towns on the Somali coast, Oman, and Iran, but the early settlers were superseded in influence in the thirteenth century by migrants from Yemen and Hadramaut.

The successive waves of migrants probably brought variant versions of Islam, including the Ibadhi and Shafi'i, and Arab and Persian influences, which eventually became integrated into the East African Swahili culture.

By the thirteenth century there were some three dozen towns between Mogadishu and Kilwa, the most important of which were Malindi, Mombasa, Zanzibar, and Sofala. These towns carried on a trade with Arabia and the Persian Gulf and, via Indonesian intermediaries, with China. Kilwa exported copper; Malindi and Mombasa, iron; and Mogadishu, cloth. Tortoise shells, rhinoceros horns, amber, leopard skins, slaves, ivory, and gold were also traded. There were also extensive coconut palm, orange, sugar cane, rice, and date cultivations along the coast. In the thirteenth century Kilwa replaced Mogadishu as the pre-eminent trading city. As Kilwa prospered, stone palaces, city-walls, and a Friday mosque were constructed; copper coins were minted.
By the end of the century a stone mosque was built, with domes in the Indian style.

Little is known about the political system of these towns but it may be surmised that they were composed of lineages. Each town may have had a council of lineage heads, although such councils were probably superseded by a dominant lineage or by an outside Arab or Persian chief who became ruler and mediator among the local clans. A small state might then be a sui generis polity over the councils and lineage heads in the surrounding territories. The rulers were legitimized in terms both of hereditary succession and of African symbols.

Islam was also well established, for Arab and Persian migrants had married into local families, stimulated local peoples to adopt an Islamic identity, and developed an Arabic-African culture in language, architecture, and dress. Ibn Battuta, who visited around 1335, saw the towns at the height of their prosperity and culture. He described Mogadishu as a Muslim community with a madrasa, scholars of Shafi'i law, and a community of descendants of the Prophet. It was ruled by officials called wazirs and amirs and showed South Arabian influences in court ceremony. Kilwa was similarly a Shafi'i community and possessed a school of law.

This prosperous East African society was destroyed by the Portuguese. Vasco da Gama discovered the region in 1498, and this discovery was followed by a vigorous campaign to control the Indian Ocean and the eastern spice trade. The Portuguese Admiral d'Almeida took Kilwa in 1505 and sacked Mombasa. By 1530 the Portuguese controlled the entire coast, basing themselves on the offshore islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, and other places. The Portuguese fought the Ottomans for control of the Indian Ocean and helped defend Ethiopia in 1542 against Muslim expansion. Portuguese domination lasted until Oman expelled them from the Persian Gulf region in 1650, attacked Pemba and Zanzibar in 1654, and finally took Mombasa in 1696. This conquest opened the way for a new wave of migrants from Oman and Hadhramaut, and for the restoration of Arab supremacy. The Omani presence occasioned a considerable trade in cloth, ivory, and slaves between East Africa, Oman, and India, but Omani political authority was short-lived. Many of the coastal towns became independent in the course of the eighteenth century and only Zanzibar continued to recognize the overlordship of Oman.

In the nineteenth century Omani influence in East Africa was revived by Imam Sayyid Sa'id bin Sultan (1804–40). His authority was at first accepted in Zanzibar and Kilwa, but progressively he forced Lamu, Pate, and Mombasa to recognize his regime. The new rulers appointed a jami' to represent them but allowed for local autonomy through the office of the muhim, who was probably nominated by the local lineages. After the death of Imam Sayyid Sa'id his sons divided Oman and Zanzibar into separate kingdoms.

In this period Zanzibar became a center for a thriving East African slave trade and a market for ivory, cloves, and gum copal, which were exchanged for cloth, beads, hardware, and weapons. Zanzibar trade with the interior expanded enormously as new routes and trading towns were established. The rulers of Zanzibar monopolized the ivory and gum copal trade, encouraged Indian immigrant merchants to invest, and also stimulated the development of a slave plantation economy based on slave labor.

The thriving slave and trading economy brought Islam to the East African interior. For centuries the Muslim presence had been confined to coastal ports, while the hinterland remained pagan, composed of self-sufficient farming communities, little involved in trade. From the eighteenth century, however, the growth of population and the formation of small states in the interior made it possible to organize caravans which brought Nyanzwe traders to the coast and Arab and Swahili traders to the interior. The trade was stimulated by the commercial interests of Sultan Sa'id of Zanzibar. By the 1820s and 1830s a handful of Arab and Swahili merchants and adventurers, responding to the increased demand for ivory and slaves, became active in the interior.

Islam was carried inland along two major trade routes. A southern route connected the coastal towns of Kilwa and Malindi with the Lake Malawi region. On this route 'Abdallah b. Said settled in Nkhoma Kora, dominated its trade, and became a local chieftain. His successors instituted Arabic and religious instruction. Yao peoples living on the eastern side of Lake Malawi adopted the new religion. The first local chieftain converted in 1870; the arrival of Muslim missionaries in 1881 helped persuade other Yao of the cultural as well as the economic value of ties to the coast. Islam was appealing as a vehicle of modernization, which brought literacy, international commerce, social contacts, and administrative expertise into central Africa.

A second route was the trade network connecting Zanzibar and the coastal town of Dar-es-Salaam with the Manyema region and Buganda. On this route Tabora was the key town; from Tabora Arab traders reached Lake Tanganyika, where they established Ujiji, which in turn became the center of an Arab and Muslim community and a base for the further diffusion of Islamic influence in Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda. In this region Arab and Swahili traders supplied local chieftains with firearms in exchange for slaves, and thus intensified the local struggle for power. Local adventurers, often supported by promoted young men turned warriors, took advantage of the situation to conquer small kingdoms. Tippu Tip, a Swahili trader and warrior, set up a
small Muslim state. Another local chief in Buganda, Mutesa, Islamized his regime by observing Ramadan, building mosques and introducing the Muslim calendar. The Islamic presence was also reinforced by the settlement of Nubians from an Egyptian expedition.

In this region Islam spread as the result of individual conversions rather than by the conversion of tribes or lineages. In general local chiefs who cooperated with Arabs in trade adopted Islam. So too did slaves and porters rooted out of their home communities. Because Islam was accepted as a religion rather than a political or communal identification, Muslims, Christians, and pagans often lived in the same villages and even in the same families. Yet by the late nineteenth century Islam had only a scattered representation in the East African interior.

**Ethiopia and Somalia**

Islam also reached Ethiopia and Somalia from the coast. To this day, the history of this region has been shaped by the struggle between Muslim and Christian peoples. In the ninth century coastal Arabs reached Harar on the Ethiopian plateau and founded a number of principalities. Arab merchants propagated Islam among their servants, trading partners, and in market villages. The Muslim Sultanate of Shoa, a loose confederation of local peoples led by merchant princes, was organized by the Maham family in the late twelfth century. The Muslim kingdom of Ifat annexed Shoa in 1381. Other Muslim principalities and smaller chieftainships abounded on the southwestern periphery of Ethiopia. Arab traders married Somali women, and created a concept of Arab Muslim Somali lineage identity. Somali peoples were mainly pastoral nomads whose culture came to be marked by heavy borrowing from Islam and the Arabic language.

The Muslim principalities bordered on an ancient and powerful Christian Ethiopian civilization. The dominant population of Ethiopia was Amharic speaking, Amharic being a Semitic language related to south Arabian, Arabic, and Hebrew. The ancient kingdom of Axum was converted to Christianity in the fourth century; from 431 Axum adhered to the monophysite doctrine. The head of the Ethiopian church was appointed by the Patriarch of Alexandria (until 1958). The Ethiopians were ruled by a Christian monarch bearing the title of Negash, who reigned over tributary local rulers. The church helped to identify the Ethiopian Christian nation with the Israel of the Old Testament as a beleaguered state surrounded by hostile pagan and Muslim neighbors. By the mid-thirteenth century a revived Ethiopian monarchy had begun to challenge Muslim merchants for control of the caravan routes to the coast. Thus began a long, bitter, and still unresolved conflict among rival kingdoms, trading peoples, and religions for control of Ethiopia.

Victory in the first phase of this struggle went to the Christians, who subdued the Muslim kingdom of Ifat and the lesser principalities by 1415. While some Muslim groups accepted Christian rule, descendants of the former rulers of Ifat founded a new Muslim kingdom called Adal along the coast of Somalia. Supported by nomadic peoples from ‘Afar and Somalia, Adal resumed the war with Christian Ethiopia, and moved its capital to Harar in 1520. Between 1516 and 1542 Muslim forces under the leadership of Isam Ahmad, supported by Ottoman troops and firearms, conquered much of southern Ethiopia, but in a decisive battle between Muslims and Christians in the north near Lake Tana in 1542, the Portuguese intervened to help Christian Ethiopia prevail over the Muslims.

The Christian victory shattered the Muslim regimes. Only the plains of ‘Afar, Somalia, and parts of southwestern Ethiopia remained Muslim. Muslim Sultanates and chiefdoms disintegrated into tribal and village communities, though Harar and the coastal towns survived as centers of Islamic trade and religious activity. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, Muslims managed to propagate Islam among Galla peoples, ‘Afar tribes, and some Tigré-speaking peoples of southern and eastern Ethiopia; in the mid-eighteenth century ‘Ali b. Daud founded a new Sultanate of Harar. Prosperity in the Red Sea and on the Horn of Africa and trade with Zayla and the Funj Sultanate helped maintain the Harar kingdom until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Galla peoples, pastoralists with a common language, culture, and sociopolitical organization, had begun to move into Ethiopia in the early sixteenth century. The Galla settled in the vicinity of Harar, slowly expanded in the Shoa and ‘Afar regions, adopted Islam, and accepted the ruler of Harar as their nominal master. In practice they maintained their tribal system and an independent political hierarchy. By the early nineteenth century the Galla tribes effectively dominated the region. Only the need to maintain an open trading base prevented the town from being overrun. Harar remained a Muslim town with numerous shrines of saints. Its peoples made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

In the early nineteenth century Muslim influence began to spread again, owing to the revival of the highland trade to the Red Sea, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the increased demand for slaves in Arabia and elsewhere. Gonder, the capital of Ethiopia, was revived by Sudanese and Ethiopian merchants,
Who brought European products and Maria Theresa gold thalers in exchange for coffee, wax, musk, and slaves. Merchant caravans also penetrated the Galla country of south and southwestern Ethiopia, importing copper, brass, knives, swords, spices, and cloth in exchange for coffee, skins, wax, and slaves. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century some 6,000 to 7,000 Ethiopian slaves, mostly pagans of Galla and Sidama origin, were being exported from Ethiopian ports. The trade benefited the Muslim elements of the population and the penetration of Muslim caravans furthered the Islamization of Galla peoples.

In northern Ethiopia Galla peoples expanded into the Sidama highlands and the Amhara provinces. Their growing influence gave Muslim merchants and scholars a foothold in these regions. In the southwest the Galla influence was even more important. New Galla kingdoms of Limmu-Innaya and Jimma-Kakka were established. The Innaya kingdom was founded by an adventurer named Bofo Abba Gomol, who adopted Islam soon after coming to power and employed the help of Muslim merchants and advisers. As in Sudan, Africa, a local ruler relied on Muslim officials, scribes, and financiers to consolidate his power. The capital of Innaya, Sakka, was a town of some 10,000 to 12,000 with several hundred 'ulams'. Sakka traded in ivory, skins, and incense from Lake Rudolph, musk, gold, ivory, and spices from Kaffa, and thousands of slaves. Gold was a royal monopoly.

Muslim holy-men and Sufi tariqat were important to the establishment of Islam. The Qadiriya had been active in the Harar region in earlier times, and spread into Somalia and Eritrea in the nineteenth century. The reform Muslim orders also came into the region. The Salafiya were established in Ogaden after 1850. Their agricultural settlements attracted runaway slaves and dethrallized individuals. The Ahmadiya were established among Somali peoples by Ali Maye Duragba and founded agricultural settlements. The Mirghaniya were established in Massawa and Eritrea between 1860 and 1899 by Sayyid Hashim al-Mirghani. Muslim holy-men settled among pagan peoples, married into the families of local chiefs, and reared children who succeeded to chieftainship and brought whole peoples over to Islam. These new Muslims venerated the shrines of local saints. At these shrines cultic practices showed a mixture of influences from the Mekkan pilgrimage, Muslim saint worship, and pre-Islamic Galla and other local ceremonies. Thus, under the influence of trade, Muslim settlement, and Galla expansion, numerous Ethiopians converted to Islam in the troubled nineteenth century.

While Galla peoples occupied the Harar plateau, Somali peoples moved southward and westward from Afar took over the Ogaden. By the eighteenth century they had pushed as far as the Juba River and controlled the coastal towns of Mogadishu, Zayla, and Berbera. In the nineteenth century they moved as far south as northern Kenya. In the course of this centuries-long migration, Somali peoples pushed out or assimilated the original Galla inhabitants of the region. The movement of Galla and Somali lineages thus established a Muslim block of peoples in southern Ethiopia and on the Horn of Africa. Thus, through tribal affiliation, a mass Islamic society comparable to that of Mauritania was created in these regions.

**Colonialism and the Defeat of Muslim Expansion**

The spread of Islamic politics in both West and East Africa was checked at the beginning of the twentieth century by the sudden imposition of European colonial rule. While European domination was secured in a sudden burst of conquests, European involvement in Africa goes back to the fifteenth century. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to explore the African coast, establish trading stations, and open commerce between West Africa and Europe. They were eager to find gold, break the monopoly of the Muslims over the traffic of the Sudan, convert local peoples to Christianity, and make them allies in the struggle against Islam. In an extraordinary century of exploration, the Portuguese discovered Madeira, the Azores, the mouth of the Senegal River, and Cape Verde, visited the Gold Coast, and finally in 1482 built the fortress of Elmina as the headquarters of a garrison which enforced the Portuguese monopoly of the Gold Coast trade.

With the discovery of the Americas and the potential for growing sugar and other crops, slaves became more important than gold, and human beings became the principal African export. The French, the English, and the Dutch entered the African trade. By the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch had seized all of the major Portuguese bases on the Gold Coast, but in the eighteenth century, the English won control of the Gold Coast and became the leading European commercial and slave trading nation. In the meantime, the French established themselves on the Senegal River in 1657 at St Louis and Goree and developed a trade in gum, wax, ivory, hides, and slaves. Europeans were almost entirely involved in exporting slaves and had little impact on the technological or cultural development of African societies. The growth of the slave trade, however, stimulated local warfare, increased the power of African rulers over their subjects, and brought new states into being. Kings and
officials became the principal slavers, exchanging slaves for weapons and other goods. Thus, most of southwestern Nigeria came under the control of the Oyo empire, and much of Ghana was ruled by the Ashanti.

In the nineteenth century, the British took the lead in suppressing the Atlantic slave trade. In 1807, an act of the British Parliament made it illegal for Britons to engage in the slave trade, and in 1833 Parliament abolished slavery in the British empire. The British used their navy to enforce the anti-slave trade laws and forced other countries to join in the prohibition. Behind the British resolve to abolish the trade was a combination of humanitarian concerns and the interest of manufacturers in a growing African market. From Bathurst, Freetown, fortresses on the Gold Coast, and the coast of Nigeria, British traders promoted traffic in palm oil, timber, ivory, and beeswax.

The suppression of the slave trade was also accompanied by the first European efforts to influence African societies. European explorers, missionaries, and colonists sought to convert Africans to Christianity and to create a new class of Europeanized Africans. European trade stimulated the rise of a new class of liberated, Western-educated Africans who formed a proto-bourgeoisie which would later become the bearer of African nationalism. For much of the nineteenth century Europeans still held the notion that Africans could be equals once they had acquired a European education and became Christians. French and British colonies were supplied with legislative and executive councils to introduce Africans to European modes of government; Africans were prepared to hold the highest offices of state. By the end of the century, however, with the rise of the determination to conquer African peoples, Europeans came to consider them inherently inferior.

In the second part of the nineteenth century, the British began to expand from the coasts into the interior looking for new markets and new sources of supply. After 1857 British factories were established up-river on the Niger. Lagos, the main port for Yorubaland, was annexed in 1861. Britain's policy was to use sufficient military and political force to protect trading interests but not to seek commercial or political monopolies. As long as interior African states were well enough organized to hold up their end of the trade and as long as other European powers did not intervene, Britain was content with minimal political engagement. The British debated whether they should keep their settlements as small and inexpensive as possible or whether they should develop strong political controls to suppress the slave trade and to promote commerce and missionary work. British policies oscillated between the two alternatives, but after 1861, in general the British moved toward direct intervention and control. Traders, explorers, and missionaries, who cried out for
increased political protection, won their case. In 1874 the British made the Gold Coast a crown colony.

In parallel with the British, the French developed their colonial empire in Senegambia. After the defeat of Napoleon, St. Louis and Gorée were returned to France and became the main bases of French expansion. Suppression of the slave trade and the growth of the gum Arabic and peanut trade prompted the French to establish inland fortified trading posts on territories rented from local rulers. In 1849 they obtained rights to open factories at Joal and Kaolack. After 1851 the French adopted a more aggressive expansionist policy. Under Louis Faidherbe, military governor from 1854 to 1863, the French annexed Dakar (1857) and pushed French trading posts into the African interior. They blocked the western expansion of al-Hajj 'Umar and took control of the lower Senegal River. In 1859 Faidherbe forced Senegal and Saloum to guarantee freedom of French commerce and to give the French a monopoly of trade and the right to buy land. A second phase of French expansion completed the absorption of the Senegambian region. After 1863 the French laid plans to establish a series of garrisons and a railway to link the Senegal and the Niger rivers. They occupied Bamako in 1883, Cayor in 1886, and Niokolo in 1887. The telegraph, the railway, and the cannon assured French domination. Henceforth, the French would not only protect trade but try to assure their permanent authority by constructing roads, establishing formal administration, and introducing legal and educational policies.

Thus the European powers turned from trading interests to political annexation. As late as 1886, Britain's Lord Salisbury denied any British or European interest in African colonies, but by 1884 the expansion of the several powers, their mutual rivalries, and their competition for prestige stimulated a wave of chauvinistic nationalism in all the European countries. The winds of nationalism fanned the flames of trading interests and political rivalry into a scramble for African colonies. The French created protectorates in Senegal; the British seized Egypt in 1882; the Germans established protectorates over Togo and the Cameroons in 1884. In the Niger region, George Tauchman Goldie had already amalgamated British trading companies into the United Africa Company in 1878; in 1886 Goldie's Niger Company was given a royal charter to administer law and customs in its territories. In 1897 the company took control of Nape, Ilorin, and Bida, and the British built a railway from Lagos to Ibadan. Progressively, in 1885, 1891, and 1900 the British government took control of the Niger Company's territories and reorganized them under the colonial office as the Protectorate of Southern and Northern Nigeria.

Between 1900 and 1906 Sir Frederick Lugard subordinated the northern Muslim emirates, and brought the Sokoto Caliphate under his control. Elsewhere, the British assumed a protectorate over the hinterlands of Sierra Leone in 1891. Having defeated the Ashanti in 1874, they took control of Kumasi and declared a protectorate over Ghana in 1896.

While the British took Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, the French went on to complete their West African empire. By a treaty of 1889 they delineated the boundaries between French and British possessions in Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. By 1893 they took Masina and eliminated the state established by al-Hajj 'Umar. They pushed back Smorí and established French colonies in Guinea and the Ivory Coast. From their bases in Senegal and the Ivory Coast, the French moved on to establish a protectorate over Futa Jallon in 1897, defeated Samori in 1898, and took control of the Upper Volta. By 1900 they had swept across the whole of the Sudan and conquered the Sahara as far as Lake Chad. Though fighting continued in the Ivory Coast until 1908 and in the Niger region until 1921 the French and British African empires were essentially established by 1900.

As in West Africa, European rivalries provoked a scramble for East Africa. British interests were inspired by the desire for trade, by opposition to slavery, and by Christian missionary zeal. Britain also had established interests in India, South Africa, Aden, and other Indian Ocean ports. In 1841, the British appointed a consul to Zanzibar, and by 1873 had sufficiently consolidated their influence to force the Sultan of Zanzibar to prohibit the slave trade. Britain began to look upon Zanzibar as its proxy for the penetration of explorers, missionaries, and traders. In 1890 Zanzibar became a British protectorate.

British expansion provoked Germany to seek compensation. In 1884 the Germans established protectorates in Southwest Africa, the Cameroons, and Togo, and between 1884 and 1888 they took control of Tanganyika, including the territories that are now Rwanda and Burundi. By agreement between the Germans and the British in 1886 and 1891, East Africa was partitioned. In 1888, the British East Africa Company acquired Kenya, which was ruled from Zanzibar until 1904 when the Kenya protectorate received its first commissioner. Britain also created a protectorate in Uganda in 1895 by treaty with the Kabaka Mwanga, the "Second" of Buganda, by the terms of which the slave trade was prohibited. By 1914 the British had extended their control over most of the local chiefs of the region.

The British also led the way to the partition of the Somali and Red Sea coasts, primarily because of their concern for the security of traffic to Aden and the Indian Ocean. First, they encouraged Egyptian and Italian interests as a barrier to French expansion. Then in 1897 they established a protectorate on
the Harar-Somali coast, and by agreement with the French defined the boundaries between their respective territories as lying between the ports of Zayla and Djibouti. In 1891 the British and the Italians agreed on boundaries between British and Italian protectorates in Somaliland. Further treaties in 1897 among Ethiopia, Britain, France, and Italy regulated the Somali protectorates. Italy achieved only a nominal and disputed protectorate over Ethiopia. In the meantime, on another front, the British, who had occupied Egypt in 1882, conquered most of the Sudan in 1898 and Darfur in 1916. Thus all of Muslim Africa — indeed all of Africa except Liberia and Ethiopia — came under European rule by World War I.

**CONCLUSION: THE VARIETIES OF ISLAMIC SOCIETY**

Islamic societies from the tenth to the nineteenth century had a complex structure. In some cases Muslim communities were isolated pastoral, village, or urban minorities living within non-Islamic societies. Examples of this type are merchant communities in West Africa or China, and lineage groups united by shrine veneration in the northern steppes of Inner Asia or parts of the Sahara. More commonly we find the several types of collectivities bound together in a larger system governed by a state regime. Islamic states were generally made up of numerous religious collectivities, village and tribal pagentry, urban jamats, Sufi brotherhoods, schools of law, and feudal principalities. Such societies have to be understood as complex systems of interacting tribal, village, and urban communities, Muslim religious associations, and the state.

The state type of Islamic system was modeled upon the Saljuq-period form of Middle Eastern Islamic society. The early Islamic model, though modified, persisted in Iran, and Turkish migrations and conquests brought it directly to Inner Asia, India, and the Arab Middle East, and via Anatolia to the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and North Africa. Though based on the same model, in each case there were differences in state organization, religious institutions, concepts of legitimacy, and religious beliefs. In the Ottoman, Mughal, Egyptian Mamluk, and Hafsid states, the government was strongly centralized. In Iran, Algeria, Morocco, and parts of the Arab world, states were weak because they were opposed by strong tribal societies, sometimes under Sufi leadership. State control of religious elites was marked in the Ottoman empire, Safavid Iran, and the state of Bukhara, but 'ulama' and Sufis in India, Algeria, and
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Morocco were relatively independent. Similarly the bases of legitimacy varied considerably. The Ottoman and Safavid empires emphasized a combination of Islamic and cosmopolitan qualities. In the Arab provinces of the Middle East and North Africa, Islamic elements predominated. Other variations occurred in the prevailing religious orientation of Muslim societies. ‘Ulama’ Islam was particularly strong in the Ottoman empire, Inner Asia, and Iran. Shrine Sufism was pronounced in India and North Africa. Everywhere Islamic culture was marked by strong local syncretisms. To fully understand the variations, however, each of the regional societies has to be compared not only with regard to specific features but as a whole system in which state, religious, and parochial collectivities and cultures interact. To conclude Part II I shall review the main regional variants and compare the overall systems with each other.

The Iranian type of Islamic society may be understood in terms of the relations among state, religious, and tribal ('uyyamas') populations. The forces that gave shape to Iran go back to the Safavid conquest in 1500. The Safavids were the religious leaders of ‘uyyamas and tribal peoples, but their empire was gradually rebuilt on the basis of slave forces and a bureaucratic administration. The Safavid regime became a suzerainty superimposed upon a society parceled out into ‘uyyamas kingdoms. Each region of Iran was under the suzerainty of the Shah but was actually ruled by a tribal lord and his warriors, descended often from Mongol Inner Asian families, who organized a local government and economy and taxed the local population. In Iran political power was from the outset divided between an imperial state and tribal societies.

The central government attempted to legitimize its reign in Muslim terms. Safavid authority was based on the claim that the rulers were descendants of the seventh imam and therefore were quasi-divine persons. As chiefs of the dominant Safi movement, they claimed the absolute obedience of all the disciples. To bolster the prestige of the state, the Safavid dynasty sponsored an Iranian-Islamic style of culture concentrating on court poetry, painting, and monumental architecture that symbolized not only the Islamic credentials of the state but also the glory of the ancient Persian tradition. The symbol of the regime was essentially Muslim, but included strong overtones of an independent Iranian cultural heritage.

In the course of Safavid rule, Iran was converted from Sunni to Shi‘i Islam. When the Safavids conquered Iran they made Shi‘ism the official religion of the country, built up cadres of Shi‘i ‘ulama’ (mainly imported from Iraq), and ruthlessly suppressed rival religious movements. Sunni ‘ulama’ and Sufi movements, even including the Safavids’ own supporters, were crushed or driven from the country. By the seventeenth century the Safavids had built up a virtually monolithic religious establishment, and eliminated rival forms of Islamic belief and organization.

Still, the relationship between the state and the Shi‘i ‘ulama’ was ambiguous. Historically, the ‘ulama’ of Iran depended upon state support, deferred to state authority, and benefited from state appointment to political and religious offices and from state endowment of religious shrines. They played the role of intermediaries and mediators between the regime and the general populace. Altogether subordinate to the Safavid state, the ‘ulama’ served to legitimize and support the central regime against its tribal and religious rivals, and took the lead in the persecution of Sunnis and Sufis. There were some doctrinal and social indications, however, of an ‘ulama’ claim to autonomy from state control and of religious doubts of the legitimacy of the Safavid regime. With the decline and eventual destruction of the Safavids, some ‘ulama’ argued that not the ruler, but the scholars themselves – the mujtahids – were the true leaders of the Islamic community. They had the wisdom to give guidance on spiritual matters in the absence of the true imams, and the people were bound, according to their teaching, to follow their advice.

The Iranian Shi‘i ‘ulama’ differed from Sunni ‘ulama’ in several respects. One was that the ‘ulama’ of Iran formed a relatively cohesive body, related through the spiritual and intellectual genealogies of teachers and students, geographically defined by the boundaries of the country, and in communication with each other. Moreover, they held a large degree of authority with the common people, and did not, as did the ‘ulama’ of the Ottoman empire, India, or Indonesia, have important Sufi or reformist movements as competitors. Thus, Iranian society before the eighteenth century was characterized as a legitimate but not powerfully centralized monarchy, a distribution of power among tribal principalities, and a monolithic religious establishment institutionalized by the regime.

The Ottoman empire represented a different constellation of state, religious, and small community relations. The Ottoman regime was highly centralized. A slave military elite, bureaucratic financial administration, and Muslim religious administration gave the central government control over the subject population. As early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman state had effectively subordinated the Turkish and Kurdish tribal populations of eastern Anatolia. Within the Ottoman empire, however, there was considerable variation in the degree of centralization of power and in the distribution of power from province to province. While the central regime was powerful in the Balkans,
most of Anatolia, the Nile Valley, Tunisia, and Algeria, much of Iraq, Upper Egypt, parts of Algeria, southern Tunisia, and Syria were dominated by segmentary populations. In these regions the authority of the central state was tenuous and the local populations were organized in tribal or Sufi-led conditions. In Tunisia, itself a subordinate state within the Ottoman empire, the centralized state was based on a highly sedentarized and urbanized population and tribal domains were limited to the south of the country. In Algeria, another vassal state based on a small janissary militia, the state governed some of the coastal regions, but most of the country was ruled by tribal and Sufi chiefs. The weakening of the Ottoman state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries allowed, in general, for a strengthening of local elites and communities.

Ottoman success in centralizing state power depended upon a number of factors. First was the power of the central regime and the relative weakness of the tribal populations. As opposed to Iran, which came under the control of the Anduzi, the Oghuz peoples who entered Anatolia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries did not bring Mongol and Chaghatay concepts of political authority and were not organized under chiefs who controlled a large central household and smaller segmentary groups. They were dispersed peoples operating small bands united by successful warrior lords or by charismatic Sufi leaders. Since these bands were relatively small it was easy for the Ottoman state to suppress them, absorb the chiefs into Ottoman administration, and deprive the Sufis of their military and political authority.

Equally important was the concept of Ottoman legitimacy. Unlike the Safavids, the legitimacy of the Ottoman regime was never questioned from a Muslim point of view. Ottoman authority was based on a Turkish tradition of patrimonial leadership, the legacy of previous Muslim states in Anatolia and the Middle East, and the conquest of the Byzantine empire. The Ottomans inherited the responsibilities of the historic Caliphates and the imperial role the ancient empires. Above all, their legitimacy was based on their success as a warrior state which fulfilled the Muslim duty of jihad, protected the Holy Cities of Arabia, and organized the pilgrimage. The doubt about the authority raised in the Safavid empire by the Shi'i ulama and the doubts raised in the Mughal empire by the accommodation of non-Muslim culture were minimal.

The organized religious life of Ottoman Muslims was also different from that of Iran. The Ottoman empire, like the Safavid, organized an ulama bureaucracy but unlike the Safavids the Ottomans kept the loyalty of the religious establishment. Government patronage and the creation of an elaborate bureaucracy absorbed the ulama into the state machine. A great judicial and a professorial hierarchy, state salaries, and state endowments effectively committed the ulama to the Ottoman regime. Even the Sufi brotherhoods, despite their large followings, were attached to the state machine and were neutralized or suppressed. Religious leaders of the Ottoman empire looked upon the state as indispensable to Islam. The Sunni ulama were totally-committed to the authority of the Sultan, and stressed the legacy of religious attitudes that legitimized the rule of the state. In Iran, by contrast, the ulama came to be independent of and hostile to the state.

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architecture, painting, and belles-lettres, and the fashions in manners and
dress. By contrast to the Ottoman and Safavid regimes, the Mughal empire
had a strong non-Islamic expression for its cultural and political identity.

In religious organization proper, Mughal India also differed from the
Middle Eastern empires. The Muslims of the subcontinent, as opposed to
Iranian Muslims, recognized no single dominant concept of Islam and no
single Muslim community or religious establishment. Indian Muslims formed
numerous religious bodies, divided by allegiance to points of doctrine, schools
of law, Sufi brotherhoods, and to the teaching of individual shaykhs, scholars,
and saints. Indian Muslims-qua-Muslims appeared as a congeries of religious
groups rather than as a single communal body.

This pluralism governed the relation of the Muslim communities to the
state. Despite state patronage of a small ‘ulama’ establishment, both ‘ulama’
and Sufis were generally independent and often critical of the cosmopolitan
and imperial culture, the Hindu elites and the patronizing loyalties of the
Mughal regime. Many Sufis, however, accepted state support or simply with-
drew from concern with public issues. Thus, Indian Islamic society was not
organized in terms of an Ottoman type of state control or an Iranian type of
uniformity, but in terms of numerous independent and competitive Muslim
religious movements.

Indo-Malay societies were not strictly parallel in form to Middle Eastern
and South Asian Islamic empires. Southeast Asia had a similar heritage of an
agrarian and commercial economic base and a history of state regimes legiti-
mized in terms of high religious culture, but in Southeast Asia, political
fragmentation rather than imperial unity was the rule. Southeast Asia was
never conquered by Muslim tribal peoples. Nor were indigenous regimes able
to achieve political unity. Indo-Malay polities evolved from within. The coast
and regional states of Malaya, Sumatra, and the principalities of Java took
an Islamic identity, but they were derived historically from pre-Islamic states.
Characteristically, Indo-Malay Muslim states depended heavily upon symbiotic
and cultural attachments to implement their rule. While Islam was woven into
the symbols of state authority, legitimation still depended upon the heritage
of Hindu and Buddhist concepts. Even as compared with Mughal India, the
non-Islamic cultural aspect of the political system was strongly pronounced.

The Muslim religious communities of Southeast Asia also tended to be
centralized; religious life was built around individual teachers and holy-men.
the Sufi brotherhoods and the ‘ulama’ schools were institutionally weak, if
there were no significant tribal communities. Scholars functioned independ-
ently, teaching through the pesantren. The village holy-men were also im-
portant influences. In Indonesia, the mass of villagers considered themselves
Muslims but were not strongly influenced by Islamic rituals, concepts, laws,
ebics, or institutions. They followed a customary religious and social life that
had existed prior to the establishment of Islam and assimilated Islam into this
preexisting culture. Islam in Indonesia was manifest as identity rather than as
social organization. Some regions were exceptions to this Indo-Malay pattern.
In Minangkabau the Sufi orders were strongly organized and there was intense
religious conflict as religious reformers struggled to bring Minangkabau into
accord with Muslim norms.

Thus, Southeast Asian Islamic societies differed from the Middle Eastern in
that there was little state participation in the organization of Muslim religious
life. The ‘ulama’, Sufis, and other popular teachers were wholly inde-
dependent. Indeed, deep in the history of the ‘ulama’ of Java and the outer
islands, there was a tradition of resistance to state authority. The common
people believed that a savior or just ruler would eventually overthrow the state
order to create a truly Islamic society. In India and Southeast Asia initiative
passed to numerous independent Sufi and ‘ulama’ reformers and charismatic
leaders who would struggle among themselves and with foreign and non-
Islamic forces to try to shape the Islamic destiny of the area in the modern
era.

Thus the several types of imperial agrarian Islamic societies may be analyzed
in terms of a pattern of institutional arrangements which involved state,
parochial, and Muslim religious institutions. In each case the pattern of
arrangements describes a variant form of Muslim society. These illustrations could
be extended to other cases, but a few suffice to show how different Islamic
societies can be analyzed in terms of their characteristic constellation of state,
religious, and local communal institutions. As Muslim societies entered the
modern era they would be drastically changed by internal reorganization and
by the impact of European imperialism and the world commercial economy.
Nevertheless, the inherited patterns would be a powerful force in the shaping
of modern Islamic societies.