by 'ulama and Sufi teachings, many, if not most, lived in a mental world defined by the heritage of local cultures. For most Southeast Asian villagers, Islam was an element of a more complex social and religious identity and not the exclusive symbol of personal and collective life. Nonetheless, in all its manifestations, Islamic identity, however understood, was the one shared factor in Malay-Indonesian societies.

ISLAM IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 20

ISLAM IN SUDANIC, SAVANNAH, AND FOREST WEST AFRICA

The formation of Islamic societies in sub-Saharan Africa was similar to Indonesia. Whereas Islamic societies in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent were established by conquest and ordered by state regimes, Islam in Africa was diffused by the migration of Muslim merchants, teachers, and settlers. Linked together by trading networks, family connections, teacher-student and Sufi fellowship, Muslim communities were established within small-scale regional states and in stateless societies. The Muslims sometimes formed peaceful minorities in non-Muslim societies. Sometimes, they converted local rulers and established a joint elite of warrior rulers and Muslim merchants. In some cases they made war against local rulers and conquered them in the name of Islam. Here we can only highlight a few of the peoples, kingdoms, and empires, and the forces of war and politics, trade and migration which were crucial to the spread of Islam. For convenience I shall divide the area into three main regions and historical periods. The first is the central and western Sudanic belt, from the origins of Islam until the eighteenth century; this was the center of a succession of Muslim empires. The second is the Guinean savannah, Senegambia, and Mauritania. This region was a center of Muslim communal settlement from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century and of Muslim jihad and state formation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the following chapter I shall discuss the eastern Sudan and East Africa, and the establishment of European colonial empires throughout Muslim sub-Saharan Africa.
Before the coming of Arab and Berber Muslim tribesmen, traders, and settlers, the Sudanic region was already an agricultural and state-centered society. Herding was carried on in the Sahil, the grassy steppelands which border the Sahara. The Sudan, a broad savanna belt to the south, produced millet, maize, yams, groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, indigo, and other crops. Sudanic societies were built around small agricultural villages or herding communities, sometimes, but not always, integrated into larger tribal and linguistic groups. The Sudan region traded with other parts of Africa and the Mediterranean, often through Berber intermediaries. The Sudan exported gold, slaves, hides, and ivory, and imported copper, silver beads, dried fruit, and cloth. Gold was found at Bambuk, at the confluence of the Senegal and Falémé rivers. For centuries the Sudan was the principal source of gold for North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Sudanic gold sustained the Aghlabid, Fatimid, and Spanish Umayyad regimes and later formed the economic basis of the Almoravid empire in Morocco and Spain. Trade also stimulated the growth of desert port cities such as Takrur, Kumbi (Ghana), and Gao and led eventually to the foundation of states.

The western and central Sudan was divided into a number of local states, but there were also large areas which were not under state control. The oldest of the Sudanic kingdoms was Ghana, probably founded between the second and the fourth centuries A.D. In the ninth and tenth centuries Ghana was both a partner and a rival of Berbers for the trans-Saharan trade. To the west of Ghana was Takrur on the Senegal River. To the east the kingdom of Kawkaw had its capital at Gao on the middle Niger River. To the south of Ghana there were no large kingdoms, but a number of small chiefships.

Sudanic states had their origin in family groups led by patriarchs, councils of elders, or chiefs of villages. The state came into existence when a local elder, an immigrant warrior or perhaps a priestly ruler, established his control over other communities. The key political factor was not the control of territory, but the relations which enabled the ruler to monopolize religious prestige, military support, and exact taxes or tribute from the subject communities. A Sudanic empire commonly had a core territory integrated by a common language, or similar ties and a larger sphere of power defined by the rule of a particular person, or lineage, over numerous subordinate families, castes, lineages, and village communities. The kings were believed to have divine powers and were considered sacred persons. They did not appear in public and were not to be seen carrying out ordinary bodily functions like eating. Around

the kings were numerous office-holders who helped govern the realm, and provincial and district chiefs often recruited from the junior members of the noble families. The Sudanic states were conquest regimes governing disparate peoples.

These states acquired an Islamic identity as a result of the conversion of the Sudanic kingdoms. The Arab conquest of North Africa intensified interest in the Saharan trade routes and multiplied contacts among Arab, Berber, Saharan, and Sudanic peoples. North African Berbers converted to Khartoum Islam in the seventh century, and Mauritani Berbers were converted in the ninth century. By the late tenth and eleventh centuries most of the Sudanese trading towns had a Muslim quarter, and Muslims were important as advisers and functionaries at the courts of local rulers. For the sake of administrative support, legitimation, and commercial contacts, the rulers of Kawkaw, Takrur, Ghana, and Bornu adopted Islam in the late tenth and eleventh centuries.

While Islam became an imperial cult and the religion of state elites and trading peoples, the agricultural populations maintained their traditional beliefs.

From the eleventh to the sixteenth century several kingdoms, in different geographical locations, succeeded each other as the principal centers of political power, trade, and Islamization. Takrur was the leading state in the seventh century. It exported gold and slaves to North Africa in return for wool, copper, and beads. Takrur was strongly committed to jihad against its non-Muslim neighbors, but came under the suzerainty of Mali in the thirteenth century and later disintegrated.

Takrur was replaced by Ghana as the preeminent center of Islam in the western Sudan. Before the conversion of its ruler the capital city of Ghana, Kumbi-Saleh, was a dual town with one district for Muslims and one for non-Muslims. The Muslim town was equipped with mosques and religious functionaries including imams, muezzins, Quran reciters, and scholars. The Muslims provided the ruler with interpreters and officials. These local influences, reinforced by Almoravid economic, diplomatic, and cultural penetration, and by the proselytizing activities of the Almoravid leader, Abu Bakr (d. 1087) and his colleague Imam al-Hadrami (d. 1095), prompted the acceptance of Islam.

With the decline of the Almoravids in the twelfth century, Ghana became the chief kingdom in the Sudan, but in the thirteenth century its former tributaries freed themselves from central control and the kingdom disintegrated.

From the early thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth century, Mali became the dominant regime in the western Sudan and the principal center of Islam. Mali had its origin among Malinke peoples living between the Senegal and the Niger rivers. A local chief, Sunjata (1230–75), of the Keita dynasty, was
able to unite the Malinke chieftains, and capture the former territories of Ghana and the region between the Senegal and the Niger rivers. The expanded territory included Bure, on the Upper Niger, the principal Sudanic gold field, and afforded wider trading connections. The Keita dynasty ruled, with some interruptions, from 1230 to 1320. The most famous of its rulers, Mansa Musa (1307–32), made a sensational pilgrimage to Cairo in 1324, which made his kingdom legendary for its wealth in gold. Mansa Musa returned to Mali with Arab and Berber adventurers who served in his administration. He built new mosques and palaces and introduced Arabic-style poetry to his court.

The empire he ruled may be taken as a typical West African Islamic regime. The basis of the political order was family and village units, the head of the family being both priest and chieftain. A group of villages in turn formed a kafa or a territorial unit ruled by a chief called the mansa. The power of the mansa was originally based on election by a group of clans, but the support of his own kinsmen, clients, and slaves sometimes allowed him to escape the control of other families, usurp power, and make himself a local monarch. Then a mansa could adopt the Ghanaian and Sudanic concepts of kingship to institutionalize his power. As a ruler, he surrounded himself with a bodyguard of armed men, often slaves, numerous servants, and elaborate ceremonies. A quasi-divine figure, the king was accepted as a symbol of the power of life and death.

The ruler and the royal clan were supported by a consortium of related clans. The descendants of the mansa supplied the principal functionaries of the empire. Client clans, castes of dependent craftsmen, and people allied by marriage or by past service, also supported the ruler. Slaves and serfs worked at agricultural settlements to provide produce for the court, the army, and the administration. The power of the ruler was basically built upon the service of various noble, serf, and slave groups, but taxes and tributes were exacted from dependent communities. For administrative purposes, there was a central core of territory directly ruled by governors, and peripheral tribute-paying territories ruled by vassal chieftains.

With the establishment of Islam as the royal cult, the king and the entire court took part in public prayers held on the great Islamic festivals. Sermons praised the king and called for obedience. Rulers acquired their Muslim credentials by building mosques, attending public prayers, appointing preachers, and celebrating the festivals. The rulers of Mali brought Muslim scholars from Cairo and Fez to help establish a West African tradition of Islamic learning. The religion of the commercial classes and portions of the political
elite helped unify the kingdom and gave cultural support to the dynasty. Islam was a bond of empire.

Muslim festivals were also the occasion for the performance of pagan ceremonies and dances. A Muslim ruler in Mali, like Muslim rulers in many other parts of the world, cultivated an authority based partly on Islam and partly on the non-Muslim cultural heritage of his own society. This was especially important in segmented African societies where only portions of the ruling elite and the trading classes were Muslim and the mass of the agricultural population was still pagan.

By the end of the fourteenth century the Mali empire was in decline. Jenne, probably settled by Muslim traders in the thirteenth century, became the crucial link to the Akan forest region (modern Ghana and the Ivory Coast) and new supplies of gold. Timbuktu (an important Tuareg trade and religious center settled in the thirteenth century) replaced Walata as a terminus of the Saharan caravan traffic. As the trade routes changed, local chieftains became independent, and reduced Mali once again to a petty chieftainry. The people of Mali remained identifiable as having a common dialect and customs, but the empire was no more.

With the breakup of Mali, the kingdom of Kawkaw which had come under Mali's hegemony regained its independence. This allowed a local leader named Sunni 'Ali (1464/65-1492) to found a new empire, Songhay, in the region of the middle Niger and the western Sudan and take control of the trans-Saharan trade. Sunni 'Ali seized Timbuktu in 1468 and Jenne in 1471, and built his regime on the revenues of their trade and the cooperation of Muslim merchants. Sunni 'Ali behaved as a Muslim in giving alms and fasting during Ramadan, but he also worshiped idols and practiced non-Muslim rites.

His successor Askia Muhammad Ture (1491-1518), supported by Mandinka clans, defeated Sunni 'Ali's son, seized the state, and furthered the work of state formation by building a standing army to supplement village levies. He extended the empire into the former territories of Mali. Askia Muhammad also tried to rally the support of Muslim religious leaders. He made Islam the official religion, built mosques, and brought Muslim scholars, including Al Maghili (d. 1504), the founder of an important tradition of Sudanic African Muslim scholarship, to Gao. The legitimation of his regime also depended upon his investiture by the Sharif of Mecca as Caliph of the lands of Taked. Nonetheless Islam remained the religion of the governing elite while the mass of Songhay society continued to be pagan.

The empire of Songhay was destroyed in 1591 by a Moroccan invasion, and the arma or the descendants of the invading army became the ruling elite in the

Islam in West Africa

The central, like the western Sudan, was also the home of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups and a center of state formation. The earliest state in this region was founded by Saharan nomads at some time in the ninth century, with its capital in the region of Kanem. Trade routes from the Fazzan brought Kharji merchants into the region, and by the late eleventh century, Islam was accepted as the religion of the ruling elite, but not until the fourteenth century did the rulers of Kanem make the pilgrimage and build mosques. In 1240 a madrasa was established in Cairo for Kanuri students, marking the integration of the central Sudan into the international network of Muslim scholarship. However, in the fourteenth century, the dynasty, defeated by pagan peoples living east of Lake Chad, was forced to abandon Kanem and move to Bornu west of Lake Chad. By this time the state had progressively united the various peoples subject to them into the Kanuri nation.

'Ali b. Danana (1476-1503) founded the new capital of Ngazargamo in Bornu, and Idris b. Muhammad (1502-1508) completed the process of state formation. He developed a standing army including a cavalry corps made up of members of the ruler's household and other chiefs, and an auxiliary infantry. The elite troops were provided with firearms. Idris b. Muhammad also furthered the Islamization of the country by reintroducing Muslim law and courts, and by building mosques and a hostel in Mecca for Kanuri pilgrims. In the seventeenth century Ngazargamo became the foremost center of Islamic education in the central Sudan. Ngazargamo had four Friday mosques, each with its own imam; the 'ulama' engaged in legal disputation at the court of the rulers. Islam, however, did not have a substantial following outside of court circles and was not the religion of the majority population.

Bornu's dominant interest was the trade in gold, salt, slaves, and weapons between the central Sudan, Tripoli, and Cairo. Its major rivals were the Hausa city-states; its major ally, the Ottoman regime in Libya. In 1511 the Ottomans had seized Tripoli and in 1517 the Fazzan, which had been a vassal of the empire of Kanem-Bornu. Bornu maintained good relations with Tripoli throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ambassadors brought rich presents of Ottoman weapons and luxury goods in exchange for slaves and gold. Bornu also maintained close trading connections with Cairo. However, by the middle of the eighteenth century Bornu's hegemony broke down,
and Bornu was transformed from a regional empire into a smaller relatively homogeneous Kanuri state.

Hausaland, which now makes up northern Nigeria, lay between the eastern kingdoms of Kanem-Bornu and the western empires of Ghana and Mali. As a cultural and political region Hausaland has taken shape only in the last millennium as a result of the westward expansion of Hausa peoples. Their expansion was marked by the conversion of woodlands into open savannah and the introduction of grain cultivation and a denser peasant population. The early Hausa peoples established numerous hamlets, villages, and town communities and formed a multi-centered society.

The earliest Hausa societies were confederacies of kinship groups led by a priest-chief. The groups in the confederacy specialized in fishing, hunting, agriculture, and crafts such as blacksmithing and salt digging. Sometimes, kingship emerged by the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of one priest-chief, who then expected the others to legitimize his rule. Such kings often turned to a universalistic religion, such as Islam, to acquire autonomous legitimation and to undermine the authority of their competitors. In other cases kingship was not an indigenous institution but grew out of the dominance of a foreign trading community. In the towns of Kano and Katsina, monarchial rule was established by colonies of Muslim traders who either directly seized the state or converted a local ruler. Ya’ku (1418–81) was the first Muslim ruler of Kano. He appointed a qadi and an imam as part of the state administration. Muhammad Rumfa (1463–99) is credited with the advancement of Islam by building mosques and schools. He commissioned al-Maghili to write a treatise on Muslim government. Other scholars from Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco turned Kano into a center of Muslim scholarship. In the sixteenth century, the new ruling dynasty of Katsina, founded by Muhammad al-Kuwast (d. 1541/23), formally adopted Islam, and invited Muslim scholars from North Africa and Egypt to reside in Katsina. By the early sixteenth century an ‘ulama’ class had emerged under royal patronage. It seems probable that the new rulers tried to convert local peoples and subvert the authority of local chiefs, but were eventually obliged to compromise. Hausaland then remained divided between a Muslim cosmopolitan urban royal society and the local kinship animistic rural societies.

The city regimes were characterized by a centralized chieftainship with a fortified capital, an elaborate court, and a substantial officialdom. By the fourteenth century, Kano had acquired a powerful military machine. The mkanwani, or chief cavalry officer, was the commander of a professional officer corps. The Kano armies were equipped with iron helmets and coats of mail.
By conquest, Kano acquired great numbers of slaves who were used as soldiers, officials, agricultural laborers, and porters on the trade routes. Colonies were created to produce agricultural revenues. The power of the state was also based on extensive trading networks. Kano became a base for the trans-Saharan trade in salt, cloth, leather, and grain, and for trade with the Ashanti and the Yorubas. Islamization generally facilitated the expansion of trade. It was the basis of an enlarged marketing network, and the 'ulama' provided legal support, guarantees, safe conducts, introductions, and other services.

In the course of the fifteenth century, under the influence of expanding international trade, and intense economic and political competition with surrounding states, the Hausa system expanded to other cities and some Hausa city-states were transformed into little empires. From the time of their institutional consolidation in the fifteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century the Hausa states were at war with each other and with neighboring peoples. In the late eighteenth century the Hausa states, like those of Bornu and the western Sudan, were economically and politically exhausted. Out of their time of troubles, however, new Muslim movements would be born.

Thus between the tenth and the eighteenth centuries a succession of Sudanic kingdoms were converted or organized under the banner of Islam. These kingdoms owed their existence to Muslim trading communities. In some cases the traders provided the economic resources, weapons, and horses that enabled local adventurers to establish state regimes. In other cases they were themselves the conquerors. In still other cases, existing Sudanic states, based upon previous nomadic conquests or chiefships, found economic support and legitimation in Islam. The prayer, rituals, amulets, and magical books of the Muslim traders were as important as their financial and administrative assistance.

The relationship between Muslim beliefs, rituals, and holy men and African chiefs was variable. In some cases the chiefs remained pagans but employed Muslim officials, traders, and advisers. In other cases the chiefs converted to Islam but maintained a cultural style which synthesized Muslim rituals and festivals with pagan customs and ceremonies. African rulers built mosques, instituted public prayer, patronized Muslim scholars, and celebrated Muslim holidays, but ceremonial dances, recitations of poems, and the drama of court life had non-Muslim sources. In the history of a dynasty, early rulers often stressed their pagan warrior virtues while later rulers stressed their Muslim ones. They maintained a double cultural orientation to express both their Islamic and their indigenous bases of authority. African kings were not retrograde Muslims but simply followed the universal tendency of Muslim regimes to blend Muslim and non-Muslim cultures. In cases such as Takur and Bornu the chiefs became fully Muslim and active patrons of Muslim religious life. Whatever the degree of their attachments, when chiefs accepted Islam, their lands were regarded by Muslims as being part of the realm of Islam (Dar al-Islam).

Islamic regimes favored the work of Muslim 'ulama' and holy-men. Only a small number of scholars held positions at court or as judges and prayer leaders but their influence was considerable. The Muslim clerics presided over prayers, sacrifices, and festivals, applied Muslim law, and established a Muslim tradition of culture. Arabic thus became important not only for the diffusion of religion but for communications and trade. It was used for official correspondence in the Ghana empire before the end of the twelfth century and in Mali in the mid-fourteenth century where the highly Islamized state of Mansa Musa had qadis and administrative departments. The earliest known Arabic texts, though, come from Bornu at the end of the fourteenth century; Arabic reached Hausaland at about the same time; fifteenth-century immigrants brought Arabic books on language and theology. Kano became a great center of Muslim learning when it was visited by al-Maghili and other North African and Egyptian scholars.

Timbuktu was probably the most important center of Arabic and Islamic studies. Its scholarly elite was drawn from a number of interrelated families representing the numerous tribal and ethnic subgroups which made up the populace of the city. While the state regimes of Mali, Songhay, and the area of Morocco rose and fell, the scholars sustained Timbuktu society. The qadi was generally the head of the community, the principal spokesman before military regimes, and the principal mediator of internal commercial and religious disputes. His influence was maintained by his connections with trading groups, and with the families who made up the jama'at or communities of the four main (and several lesser) mosques. Through the qadis and the scholars, Timbuktu remained an organized community and a center of Muslim scholarship regardless of the fortunes of political regimes.

The scholarly families were sustained by trade, investments in cloth, camels, cattle and urban property, contributions of rulers and state officials, and the donations of their students and disciples, who worked as traders and tailors. For centuries the 'ulama' of Timbuktu maintained a rich and vital tradition of Qur'anic, hadith, and legal studies, supplemented by studies in theology, linguistics, history, mathematics, and astronomy. An important biographical dictionary of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century scholars, written by Ahmad Baba (1516–1627), indicates a high level of Arabic learning, close
contact with Mecca and Egypt, and the activity of numerous Muslim learned men. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Timbuktu became a center of regional historical scholarship as well.

**MERCHANDS AND MISSIONARIES IN THE DESERT, FOREST, AND COASTAL REGIONS**

Outside of the Sudanic region Muslim merchant, pastoralist and cultivator communities, groups of warriors, traders, and religious teachers lived in caste-like enclaves within the larger society. These were generally small and scattered settlements. In different regions they had different roles to play in relation to other African communities and in the expansion of Islamic identities.

The Saharan regions from Mauritania to Lake Chad formed one zone of Muslim communal and religious organization. After the breakup of the Songhay empire at the end of the sixteenth century, the Saharan societies, regardless of ethnic or linguistic identity, came to be hierarchically stratified into a dominant warrior elite, usually ruled by a single lineage, and subordinate peoples. The subordinated peoples included religious lineages and artisan slave groups. The religious lineages called zawyas or insilismen lived by pastoralism and commerce but were renowned for their scholars and held high esteem because they claimed Arab or sharifian descent. Each of the major caravan trading posts such as Walata, Timbuktu, and Agades was the base of a particular religious community and a center of its economic and religious network. The religious lineages also shared a common intellectual tradition which merged Islamic law and Sufism, a combination which gave them competence and personal authority to religious leaders and made them important as political mediators.

The Kunta family is the best-known example of a scholarly lineage with widespread influence throughout Mauritania, Senegambia, and other parts of the western Sudan. The family's history goes back to Shaykh Sidi Ahmad i Bakka'i (d. 1306) who established a Qadiri zawiya (Sufi residence) in Walata. In the sixteenth century the family spread across the Sahara to Timbuktu, Agades, Bornu, Hausaland and other places, and in the eighteenth century large numbers of Kunta moved to the region of the middle Niger where the established the village of Mabrouk. Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1728–1811) united the Kunta factions through successful arbitration and negotiation and established an extensive confederation. Under his influence the Mankilli school of law was reinvigorated and the Qadiri order spread throughout Mauritania, the middle Niger region, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Futa Toro, and Futa Jallon. Kunta colonies in the Senegambian region became centers of Muslim teaching.

A student of Sidi al-Mukhtar, Shaykh Sidiya al-Kabir (1771–1868), established another Islamic network in Mauritania. Sidiya began his religious education by memorizing the Quran and then went on to studies of poetry, theology, grammar, and law. In 1809–10 he apprenticed himself to Sidi al-Mukhtar. As student, secretary, and adviser to a family that had a powerful part in the revival of the Qadiri order, extensive trading operations, and political authority in the southern Sahara, Sidiya was introduced into one of the most sophisticated of Saharan and West African societies. Sidiya studied both law and mysticism, including the works of al-Ghazzali and Ibn al-'Arabi. Knowledge of law was the basis of judicial and political authority. The two subjects were complementary. Sufism was the basis of the personal capacity to adapt textbook law to real situations. The authority of the judge not only depended on his technical knowledge but on his personal insight, his religious qualities, and his reputation for being able to perform miracles.

After some 35 years Sidiya returned to his home community, established his residence at Bou Slimat and eventually won a predominant influence among the tribes of the region on the basis of his reputation for generosity, fairness, and sympathy in dealing with conflicting interests. As a successful mediator he became wealthy from gifts of livestock, the revenues of gum and salt caravans, and the work of clients who cultivated his fields. The shaykh, then, became the leader of an association of believers who looked to him for guidance in political, economic, legal, and moral matters. As a successful mediator and economic organizer, Sidiya acquired a reputation as a miracle-worker. After his death his eldest son Sidiya Baba (1825–1916) succeeded him. Even after France occupied Mauritania, Sidiya's family was able to maintain its political influence. A similar kind of Muslim religious community and scholarly tradition was found in the forest and coastal regions south and west of the Sudanic states - in the Voltaic River basin and the Guinean forests. In this region the Muslim communities were founded by merchants and cultivators often linked by family ties and trading networks. These merchants were generally known as Wangara or Dyula. Their communities grew up along the trade routes at the crossings of rivers, at toll posts, and at stopping-places for caravans where merchants settled down to trade with the local populace. The trading communities often developed agricultural interests, and in some cases Muslims became the custodians of specialized crafts such as weaving and dyeing. Their scholars and holy men carried on the tradition of Islamic learning and offered their religious services to local chiefs.
As in the Sahara, these communities were established amidst a highly segmented society. Lineage systems, age-group associations, secret societies, and religious cults were the bases of political association. State regimes were of limited scope. Political units were not based upon ideology or a history of shared culture and ethnicity but rather upon sudden conquests by small minorities. They governed heterogeneous populations which did not necessarily share a common language or customs. Heterogeneity was reinforced by rapid fluctuations in state power, migrations, and conquests, and by the movements of roving bands of refugees needing protection, warriors looking for conquests, or traders seeking profits. Moreover, these African societies were divided into caste-like strata including distinct elite political lineages, occupational groups including iron and leather workers, musicians, and different types of free men and slaves. In this highly segmented world, Muslim communities were introduced as yet another set of specialized warrior, trading, and religious groups.

In each sub-region the circumstances of Muslim settlement were different. The Upper Volta region attracted Muslim merchants in the fifteenth century by the opening of the Akan gold fields, and the opportunity for trade in gold, kola nuts, and salt. Some of these merchants were Soninke-speaking people from Timbuktu and Jenne who later adopted Malinke dialect and became known as Dyula. They settled the towns of Bobo-Dyulasso, Kong, Bundake, and other places leading to the gold fields. Other traders came from Kanem-Bornu, and the Hausa city-states and moved into Gonja, Dagomba, and other parts of the Volta region. The most important merchant center in this area was Begho, on the edge of the Akan forest, crucially situated for the exchange of gold and kola nuts. Begho became the terminus for the trade routes connecting Buna, Kong, Bobo-Dyulasso, and Jenne.

In these regions Muslim traders were well integrated into the general population. Sometimes Muslims married local women and raised families which were tied to the Muslim community through the father and to the local pagan community through the mother. The offspring of such marriages often inherited local chieftainships and brought about the conversion of local peoples. They helped carry on local festivals, offered prayers and divination in local courts, distributed amulets and participated in anti-witchcraft rituals. As a result, Muslims in the Middle Volta region were not a distinct language group but regarded themselves as part of the Dagomba, Gonja, or Mossi kingdoms. Because of assimilation, Muslim religious influence was strongest in the kingdoms of Gonja and Dagomba. The Gonja state had been established...
toward the end of the sixteenth century by Mande warriors with the help of Muslim advisers and couriers. Though the chiefs came under Muslim influence they did not formally convert to Islam. Court ceremony and culture remained a mixture of Islamic and pagan practices. Children in the families of the chiefs were circumcised and took Muslim names but this was done in accord with pagan and not Muslim ceremonies. Festivals followed the Muslim calendar but had no obvious Muslim features. Thus the chiefs tried to maintain elements of both pagan and Muslim ritual in order to satisfy the cultural interests of their double constituencies.

Islamic influence among the political elite spread from Gonja to Dagomba. The first Dagomba ruler to convert to Islam had been defeated by the Gonja rulers and therefore turned to the Muslims for the magic that helped produce victories. Dagomba chiefs adopted circumcision, Muslim names, the Muslim calendar, and Muslim festivals and burial practices. Maliki law influenced customary law and pre-Islamic pagan festivals were merged into Muslim ones. The relatively centralized political system of the Dagomba also favoured the spread of Islam. Since the state was divided into territorial and village chieftainships each of which, in imitation of the royal court, sought the religious and magical support of Muslim clerics, a Muslim presence was established throughout the region. Sons of Dagomba chiefs who had no prospect of obtaining a ruling position commonly converted to Islam. The chiefs also gave their daughters in marriage to Muslims in order to draw the two estates closer together.

In Dagomba Muslims came to perform important functions such as circumcision, washing the dead, officiating over festivals, and slaughtering meat. By the early nineteenth century imams were widely appointed in Dagomba villages. The imam of Yendi, the capital city, held a position of particular importance as the head of the Muslim community. He was the leader of Friday prayers and the enforcer of Muslim law. By the end of the nineteenth century, although the political chiefs remained pagan, many Dagomba families had Muslim members and Muslims were considered part of the Dagomba people.

While Muslims of Gonja and Dagomba were assimilated into the general society, west of the Black Volta the Muslim trading communities remained isolated enclaves and kept their own languages and a separate ethnic identity. Muslims maintained isolated communities built around their neighborhood mosques, and schools. Here Muslims were important as traders, courtiers, religious magicians, but they had little missionary spirit and did not try to convert local peoples to Islam.
Senegambia the legacy of the Tukur and Mali empires was faintly kept alive in a number of small-scale states. To this was added Muslim village communities and town quarters amidst, but politically independent of, non-Muslim peoples and states. By the eighteenth century there were important Muslim settlements in Kankan, the hinterlands of Sierra Leone, Gambia, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro. Nineteenth-century Freetown, for example, originally a Christian settlement for liberated slaves, had colonies of Dyula migrants and Hausa and Yoruba Muslims taken from slave ships. The various ethnic groups were organized into jamats (communities) which had their own mosques and imams and which settled their disputes internally. Taxes were imposed on the communities to provide for religious services and to support the poor. A council of alimamis (religious leaders) shared a Friday mosque and a joint Muslim government high school founded in 1891, and organized banquets and prayers to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet. The Muslims acquired land and political power but commonly lived under their own chiefs (ahladi al-imamamis) and pursued their own lifestyle.

Of particular importance in this region were the Muslim scholarly lineages. In Senegambia, the Jakhanke inhabited scattered towns and villages in Futa Jallon, Bundu, Dentilia, Bambuk, and other places. These peoples claimed to originate in Ja on the Niger River and Jahaba on the Bafing River from which they moved into Bundu, Futa Jallon, and Gambia. The Jakhanke were both merchants but were settlers of small agricultural communities supported by slave labor. The various Jakhanke villages were independent of each other and of the local chiefs. One of their deepest principles was withdrawal from politics. The Jakhanke were committed to peaceful coexistence and refused to become engaged in politics or war. When threatened they simply moved their villages to safer territory. Often their villages enjoyed the privileges of sanctuary, judicial independence, and freedom from military service.

The Jakhanke had a reputation for exceptional learning. They traced the spiritual ancestry to al-Hajj Salim Suwari, who probably lived in the fifteenth century. They adhered to Maliki law although they were tolerant of customary practice. They stressed the importance of obedience to the mushaf or Sufi master, and of stages of initiation into the teachings of the community. The Jakhanke interpreted dreams and gave amulets for protection. They celebrated the birthday of the Prophet and the feasts of the end of Ramadan and other Muslim holidays. Though saint worship was not common in West Africa, they believed that the spirit of dead saints kept guard over the followers and interceded for them before God. The graves of al-Hajj Salim and the other great teachers were centers for pilgrimage. In all but name the Jakhanke extended family was a Sufi lineage.

As a result of the diffusion of these communities, by the end of the eighteenth century Islam in West Africa was the religion of scattered groups of Tokolos and Songhay, and Dyula trading colonies, some Hausa towns, and of the dominant classes of the central Sudanic states. Islam also had a foothold among the Wolof, the Yoruba, and the Mossi. These communities sometimes converted to Islam when traditional agricultural communities broke down and their populations were integrated into larger social, political, and cultural units. Slave trading and state formation therefore favored Islam. Reciprocally, communities without extensive trading connections or political centralization found it easier to preserve a non-Muslim identity. The durability of family and village institutions, the depth of African religious culture and the strength of traditional authorities helped to maintain a non-Islamic African majority.

The Muslim settlements were also centers for the diffusion of Islamic and Arabic culture. Towns like Timbuktu made the Quran, the sayings of the prophet, and Islamic law familiar to local peoples. The translation of religious texts into vernacular Swahili, Wolof, Hausa, Somali, and Zenaga followed.
Arabic also had a strong influence upon non-Arabic African languages. Many of them have come to be written in Arabic script; there was a heavy borrowing of Arab and Muslim vocabulary into Fulbe, Wolof, and other languages. Arabic was also used to record family histories, dowries, debts, merchant accounts, information about trading itineraries, and so on. It became increasingly important as an ordinary means of communication for government and merchant elites.

These lineages—the Kunta, the Saghunigha, and the Jakhanke and others—were closely linked by trading networks, by affiliation with the Qadiriya brotherhood, and by shared religious and intellectual traditions. Without a territorial identity or a state regime they constituted an Islamic society in West Africa. They are a principal illustration of the way in which small communities organized by religious and lineage ties make up, even in the absence of state regimes, a self-sufficient type of Islamic society. The structure of these communities would be an important precedent for the organization of Muslim religious associations in twentieth-century secularized African states and has numerous parallels in the organization of Muslim minorities all over the world.

**The West African Jihads**

While the quietist tradition was important for the spread of Islam, militant action could grow out of the same social structures and intellectual traditions. Alongside of peaceful Muslim colonization there was a parallel tradition of militant determination to turn small colonies into Muslim states by defeating corrupt Muslim rulers, conquering the pagan populations, converting them to Islam, and ruling them according to Muslim law. The jihads of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were led by Muslim scholars and teachers, itinerant preachers and their student followers, and the religious leaders of trading and agricultural communities. They took their inspiration from the militant reformers of the fifteenth century such as al-Maghili, from Islamic literary influences, and from the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, which may have brought West African scholars into contact with reformist Sufi circles.

With the Almoravid movement as a shadowy precedent, the jihads began in the sixteenth century when, from Mauritania to Chad, there were reformist outbursts. At first the jihads rose in dispersed places, but gradually they influenced each other, and culminated in a region-wide struggle to establish Muslim states. The jihads were finally suppressed by the British and the French at the end of the nineteenth century.

The earliest well-known jihads occurred in Mauritania and Senegambia.
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The jihad in Mauritania had its origin in the resistance of Berber peoples to the dominance of the Arab Bain-Ma'qil. Their leader, Nasir al-Din, denounced the rulers for failing to perform the prayers, consorting with musicians and jugglers, and pillaging the people. Nasir al-Din claimed to be sent by God to stop the oppression. He called himself al-mami (inam) and amir al-mu'minin, the traditional title of Muslim Caliphs, proclaimed the end of time and the coming of the mahdi, and demanded that his followers conform to the teachings of the Quran. His followers swept through southern Mauritania in 1673, but Nasir al-Din was killed in 1674 and the movement defeated by 1677. The outcome of the war was the lasting military dominance of the Arab tribes over the Berbers, who were henceforth deprived of political power and relegated to purely economic and religious roles. Though paying tribute to the Arab Hassanis, the Berbers (called zawa'ay) took up the roles of qadis, teachers, and spiritual counselors and were economically engaged in the mining and marketing of salt and gold. Arabic, maintaining wells, organizing caravans, and raising livestock. The zawa'ay would continue the struggle for Islamic principles and later give rise to both peaceful missionary movements and jihads in Senegal.

In Senegambia, Muslim jihads had their origins in the efforts of small Muslim communities to overthrow local rulers and to establish states of their own. In this region the jihads were not simply Muslim rebellions against pagan overlords. Senegambian society was stratified into three main caste levels: nobility whose power rested upon training in war, the Islamic community, and commoners engaged in crafts and agriculture. These castes were forbidden to intermarry, though one could leave either the noble or peasant caste to be initiated into the Muslim community. The basic issue in these societies was conflicting claims of the military nobles and the Muslim clerics to political leadership. The nobles based their claim on experience in war and the Muslim clerics based theirs upon superior knowledge. The conflict between the warriors and the Muslims was symbolized by the use of alcohol by the former and rejection by the latter.

Muslim leadership came from a stratum of society called the torode that was neither a class nor an ethnic group. The torode were Muslim Fulbe scholars, teachers, and students. Though they spoke Fulbe as a common language, they had no ethnic or tribal identity. Some torode were supported by the work of students or slaves and the contributions of artisans, but many were wandering beggars. The ranks of the torode also attracted uprooted peoples, outlaws, vagrants, and runaway slaves.

The first torode-led jihad came in Bundu at the end of the seventeenth century, where Malik Dauda Sy founded a Muslim regime over a mixed population. In the 1690s he and his successors organized a state with the power to appoint and dismiss village chiefs. In the eighteenth century the rulership reverted for a time to pagans, but then Bundu had become predominantly Muslim.

The Futa Jallon jihad was the work of the settled Muslim communities allied with Fulani pastoralists. Both the settlers and the Fulani had been migrating into the region since the thirteenth century, with additional influx of Fulani in the seventeenth century. Both groups were subordinated to the dominant Jalonke landlords to whom they paid taxes on trade and cattle. In the eighteenth century both the Muslim settlers and the pastoralists improved their economic position as a result of a growing trade in cattle and hides with Europe, and allied against their Jalonke landlords. Islam became the banner of their solidarity and their resistance to the non-Muslim elites. In 1765 Ibrahim Musa, known as Karamoko Alfa (d. 1775), proclaimed a holy war and took the title of al-mami. He gathered the support of young men's gangs, seguedes, and slaves and began a long struggle against the political elites. The Muslims finally prevailed in 1776, when Ibrahim Sori (1776–93) was named Al-mami. The new state was divided into several provinces, which formed a council to elect a ruler. The al-mami was selected alternatively from among the descendants of Ibrahim Musa and Ibrahim Sori; the former tended to represent the more pacific tradition of Muslim learning, the latter the more aggressive tradition of jihad. Under the authority of the al-mamis the provinces were ruled by appointed governors, and the misidi or family hamlets were ruled by local chieftains and councils of elders. The most important state activity was jihad, which was the source of slaves for export and for use on agricultural plantations. The central power, however, was gravely weakened by the emergence of a landowning aristocracy who descended from the original jihad warriors and by succession disputes between the two families which provided the al-mamis. Futa Jallon eventually came under a French protectorate in 1881 and recognized French suzerainty in 1896/7.

In the Senegal river valley, Futa Toro was the center of another jihad. Closely related to Bundu the Muslim movement in Futa Toro was the work of the torode religious teachers and itinerant beggars who rebelled against the local dynasty in protest at fiscal oppression and lack of protection from Mauritani raids. Under the leadership of Sulayman Bal (d. 1775) the torode established an independent territory. Sulayman was succeeded by 'Abd al-Rahman (1776–1806), a highly educated teacher, judge, and mediator, who had ruled in Cayor province and thus was closely related to the widespread
Senegambian and Guinean network of Muslim teachers. From his inauguration the turuq became more militant. The new state encouraged the construction of mosques, and furthered settlement of the river frontiers with Mauritania. It invoked jihad to attack the Moors in 1786 and invaded Waio, Jolof, and Cayor by 1790. The Muslim state expanded into the upper Senegal as well. After a critical defeat in 1790, the almamate disintegrated. The turuq intermarried with the former rulers, seized land, and became an elite of local chiefains who usurped the power of the central government. While almamis continued to be appointed throughout the nineteenth century, they no longer had any political power. However, memory of the early successes would again inspire jihads in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The central Sudan was a second locus of jihad. Here, too, Muslim clerics and reformers dreamed of establishing an Islamic society on the model of the life of the Prophet and the early Caliphs. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries itinerant Muslim teachers aspired to reform the lives of Muslims and to create a truly Islamic society. Such teachers as Jibril b. Umar had traveled to Mecca and Medina, where they were influenced by the then-prevailing reformist Sufi views. They returned to preach the principles of the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet, upheld the rule of Shari‘a, and encouraged individuals to seek personal sanctity. They also taught the doctrine of the double jihad; the inner jihad, the struggle against the corruption of the body, which must precede the outer jihad, the war against pagan rulers and corrupt Muslim governments and their hired ‘ulama’. Hijra, migration to a true Muslim community, and jihad, a war in the name of the faith, were the overriding obligations. Thus they introduced a universalistic and theocratic concept of Islam as the supreme arbiter of social life and as the transforming force in the lives of individuals. For them Islam was an exclusive religion incompatible with African cults. This new message was preached with messianic fervor. Throughout west and central Africa the thirteenth Muslim century (corresponding to the nineteenth century) was expected to mark the victory of Islam over the infidel world. This was to be the age of the mujaddid or renewer of Islam who comes once every century, and of the Caliph o Tahir, the twelfth Caliph, whose rule would be followed by the coming of the mahdi; this would be the age of the precursors of the mahdi and of the messiah himself.

Uhman b. Sufi (1754–1817) was the greatest of these new leaders. Uhman was a descendant of a toruq family, well established in Hausaland, a student of Jibril b. Umar, an uncompromising opponent of corrupt practices, and a proponent of jihad. He began his African preaching in 1774/1

wandering from place to place as an itinerant mullah (religious scholar). For a time he accepted the patronage of the Hausa state of Gobir. His position was like that of the Muslim scholars who for centuries had found in the Hausa courts attractive opportunities to establish their influence, but who chafed against the restrictions placed upon them. Publicly expressing his frustration with the failure of the rulers to put Islam into practice, Uhman broke with the royal court. Disillusioned, he returned to Dogal to preach to his followers.

The tradition of reform in which Uhman preached also had African origins. In the fifteenth century al-Maghili had denounced the corrupt and un-Islam practices of West African Muslim states. He condemned illegal taxation and the seizure of private property, and denounced pagan ceremonial practices and "vowel" mauls who served rulers without adequate knowledge of Arabic or Islam. Al-Maghili called for the implementation of Muslim law by a strong and committed Muslim ruler, and introduced into West Africa the concept of the mujaddid. In this vein, Uhman criticized the Hausa rulers for unjust and illegal taxes, for confiscations of property, compulsory military service, bribery, gift-taking, and the enslavement of Muslims. He also criticized them for condoning polytheism, worshiping fetishes, and believing in the power of slaves, divination, and conjuring. Another strand in his preaching derived from the tradition of Maliki law, communicated through Timbuktu and Bornu, and reinforced by reformist religious currents emanating from Mecca and Medina. Uhman denounced pagan customs, the free socializing of men and women, dancing at bridal feasts, and inheritance practices which were contrary to Muslim law. As in other Islamic societies, the autonomy of Muslim communities under 'ulama' leadership made it possible to resist the state and the state version of Islam in the name of the Shari‘a and the ideal Caliphate.

Uhman's influence was based on deep knowledge of Muslim law, and his many compositions in Arabic and Fulbe. Later he began to have mystical visions. A vision in 1784 led him to believe he had the power to work miracles, and to teach his own mystical wud and itiny. He later had visions of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, the founder of the Qadiriya, and an experience of ascension to heaven where he was initiated into the malaq of the Qadiriya and the Prophet. Here, he was named the imam of the walls (saints) and presented with the sword of truth. In general, his theological writings were concerned with the concepts of the mujaddid, the hijra, the role of 'ulama' in teaching the true faith, and the role of reason and consensus in the derivation of Muslim law. All of these concerns bear on the problem of the authority of an individual scholar to challenge the established political and religious elites. Out of these
concerns, Usman produced numerous tracts on political theory, biographies, histories, and other contributions to African-Islamic literature. Many people regarded him as the mahdi come in fulfillment of popular prophecies.

Usman's appeal to justice and morality rallied the outcasts of Hausa society. He found his principal constituency among the Fulani, a racially diverse pastoral population. Primarily cattle pastoralists, they were dependent upon peasants for access to river beds and grazing lands, and were taxed accordingly. Hausa peasants, runaway slaves, itinerant preachers and others also responded to Usman's preaching.

In 1804, the conflict between Usman and the rulers of Gobir came into the open. The rulers forbade Muslims to wear turbans and veils, prohibited conversions, and ordered converts to return to their old religion. Usman declared the hijra and moved from Degel to Gudu where he was elected insmir al-mu'minin, and Sarkin Musulmi - head of the Muslim community. There he declared the jihad. In the war which followed, the Muslims rallied Fulani support, and by 1808 defeated the rulers of Gobir, Kano, Katsina, and other Hausa states. They expanded into the territory south of Lake Chad as far as the forest zone. By 1810 the jihad engulfed most of what is now northern Nigeria and the northern Cameroons.

The regime founded by Usman is known as the Caliphate of Sokoto. Usman was Caliph; his brother 'Abdallah, based in Gwandu, and his son Muhammad Bello, based in Sokoto, were his viceroys. Usman retired to teaching and writing and in 1817 Muhammad Bello succeeded him.

Sokoto was a combination of an Islamic state and a modified Hausa monarchy. Bello introduced an Islamic administration. Muslim judges, tax inspectors, and prayer leaders were appointed, and an Islamic tax and legal system was instituted, with revenues on the land considered kharaj and the levied on individual subjects called jaya, as in classical Islamic times. Fulani cattle-herding nomads were sedentarized and converted to sheep and goat raising as part of an effort to urbanize them and bring them under the rule of Muslim law. Mosques and schools were built to teach the populace Islam. The state patronized a large community of religious scholars (mullahs), some of whom were tied to the government as administrators and advisers, while others rejected worldly power and lived among the common people. The jama'at movement helped to fortify the practice of Islamic law in Hausaland and generated a theological, legal, astrolgical, and vernacular poetic literature in the Hausa language. Sufism became widespread and Hausa society became fully part of the Muslim world. Kano became famous for law, za'ira for Arabic grammar, and Sokoto for mysticism. The Sokoto scholars were mainly 
his own officials and essentially displaced the rulers. Speaking for Bornu, he denied that the jihad was legitimate when waged against Muslim peoples regardless of whether they were good or bad Muslims.

When al-Kanemi died in 1837 he was succeeded by his son, Umar, who took direct possession of the Bornu monarchy. Thus a new dynasty and a new Muslim state was founded as a reaction against the jihad. The new regime was built upon an aristocracy consisting of the royal family, courtiers, and nobles called _Aqapara_. The regime appointed qadis and imams, and professed to be as genuinely Muslim as the rival Sokoto Caliphate. The regime had a double structure of administration. One system was applied to the control of territories and all the resident populations; the other was directed to the control of clans and ethnic and craft associations. The existence of both territorial and group administrations indicates a society in transition from clan-lineage to territorial forms of organization.

In the region south of Lake Chad, Modibbo Adama (d. 1847) received the flag of legitimacy from Uthman and established a Muslim state in Fombina. This was also based on the support of Fulani pastoralists united by Islam. His government was reinforced by invitations to Muslim scholars to settle the region and take official positions. Later rulers proclaimed the supremacy of Muslim law, and a judicial hierarchy was established in which cases could be appealed from local courts to the ruler of Fombina and from him to Sokoto.

The jihad inspired by Uthman also helped spread Islamic state power and religious influence in southern Nigeria. Muslim traders from Bornu, Songhay, and Hausaland had come to Yoruba in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and converted the first Yorubas to Islam. With the help of the Sokoto Caliphate Muslims won control of Ilorin, which was the principal Muslim center in southern Nigeria until it was replaced by Ibadan. At the same time, by peaceful means, Muslim quarters were being formed in Abookuta and other towns where they cooperated with existing elites. Liberated slaves from Sierra Leone and Brazil established a Muslim presence in Lagos. Their communities were organized under the leadership of imams, who led the prayers and festivals and mediated disputes.

In the region of Air, north of Sokoto, the Caliphate supported the jihad of Muhammad al-Jaylani (1777-1840), a reformer who had read al-Maghili and wanted to establish a Muslim state. Uthman's jihad had awakened the aspirations of the Tuareg insilimien (religious lineages) to create a Muslim society independent of the warrior chiefs—a society which would settle and urbanize...
the Tuareg and regulate their lives in accord with the Quran. The new order would bring about the equality of all tribes, require the seclusion of women, and prohibit singing and drumming.

In Masina, Uthman inspired Ahmad Lobbo, a Fulani scholar born in 1775, to dream of overthrowing animist chiefs. Supported by scholars from his own clan, by slaves, and by a local trading clan (the Marka), he formed a small community. The Fulani helped Ahmad overthrow Bambara rule in 1816 and form a Muslim state which lasted until 1862. The Masina state had its capital at Hamdallahi, founded in 1821. Ahmad took the title of amir al-mu'minin and appointed a governor and a judge in each province. The state was based on a highly organized army supported by a system of granaries created to provision the soldiers and spare the local population from abuse. A council of state was made up of religious teachers; the local administrative apparatus was filled with relatives and clients of the learning counselors. Ahmad Lobbo also tried to create an Islamic type of society. Pagan Fulani were required to convert to Islam. New legislation was introduced, including controls over women, and the suppression of fortune telling, tobacco smoking, and prostitution.

The jihads of the central Sudan indirectly inspired a revival of jihad in the Senegambian region. The tradition of Futa Toro and Sokoto were combined to inspire al-Hajj Umar (1794–1864), another great nineteenth-century leader of West African Muslim movements. Al-Hajj Umar was born in Futa Toro, became one of the towobbe, and in 1826 made the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he was initiated into the Tijani order and returned as the order's khalifa for the Sudan. He stayed in Sokoto from 1831 to 1837 and married a daughter of Muhammad Bello. In 1845 Umar settled in Jagun in the frontiers of Futa Jallon, where he could preach to local peoples. Growing tension with the leaders of Futa Jallon forced him to move in 1851 to Dingiray, where he began the militant phase of his mission. There he organized his followers into a professional army equipped with French weapons, and in 1852 proclaimed a jihad against pagan peoples, lapsed Muslims, and European intruders.

Umar claimed a transcendental personal authority. He denied the importance of adherence to a school of law and favored ijtihad, or personal religious judgment. He taught that a believer need not belong to a school but should follow the guidance of a Sufi shaykh who has immediate personal knowledge of the divine truth. The teachings of such a shaykh, he held, would be in full accord with the law. Umar claimed the titles of amir al-mu'minin, khalifa (the successor of the Prophet), mujaddid (renovator of Islam), qutb (pole of the universe), and waizir of the mahdi. He claimed to possess iftikhar or divine guidance in time of difficulties. Thus he claimed virtually every form of Muslim spiritual and temporal authority. His allegiance to the Tijaniyya was the basis for a break with all established Muslim authorities and for a personal appeal as shaykh and savior.

His appeal in Futa Toro, the scene of an earlier and by then aborted effort to establish a Muslim state, was enormous. Umar first appealed to the populace on the basis of local grievances against the military elites. His followers regarded him as their amir and reviver of the eighteenth-century revolutions. His community also appealed to rootless individuals of mixed ethnic background, who found new social identity and opportunities for conquest under the aegis of Islam. Umar came to embody the modern ideal of religious revival and conquest of pagans.

His jihad began in 1852 with the conquest of Futa Toro. There he came into conflict with the French, who were attempting to establish their own commercial supremacy along the Senegal River. At Medina in 1857, they defeated Umar, and closed off the Senegal valley. In 1860 Umar made a treaty with the French which recognized their sphere of influence in Futa Toro and assigned him the Bambara states of Kaara and Segu. In quest of new territory, Umar and masses of followers from Futa Toro invaded Masina, thus carrying the war to Muslim peoples along the Niger bend. His enemies, led by Ahmad al-Kanta al-Bakka'ī (of the Qdratt order), denounced this as an illegitimate war of Muslims upon Muslims and promoted a coalition of local states, including Masina and Timbuktu, to resist. His enemies defeated and killed him in 1864, but his followers captured Hamdallahi and established a state which lasted until 1893.

Umar's state was officially Muslim and forbade dancing and the use of tobacco and charms, and prohibited pagan ceremonies and the worship of idols. Umar was strongly influenced not only by West African reformist concepts but by the teachings of the Tijaniyya and of other reformist movements which stressed the importance of strict obedience to Muslim practice. Apart from this, its Islamic content was limited, and the primary function of the state was predatory warfare, slavery, and the accumulation of booty. The conquest was not linked to the productive economy. The decline of the central government only accentuated the tendency to warfare, since local chieftains took to raiding to support their troops. Muslim jihad shaded over into a purely military exploration of the surrounding peoples. Umar's state, in disarray, was finally overwhelmed and absorbed into a growing French West African empire in 1893.

After Umar's death jihad flared again in other parts of Senegambia. In the middle and later part of the nineteenth century the action shifted to the Wolof
people of Senegal. Berber and Tukolor Muslim teachers had been active since the eighteenth century in the provinces of Walo and Cayor, where they were respected for their literacy and their magical skills. In the nineteenth century Muslim influence increased further, owing to the suppression of the slave trade and the growth of the peanut, oil, and soap industries. The development of the new industries favored the economic and political power of Muslim peasants against the tyedo slave military elites. In response to new economic and political conditions Islam provided the idiom for peasant resistance to tyedo rule and for the integration of peasants and traders into a larger economy.

The great Senegambian jihad of this period was led by Ma Ba (1809–67), a Quran teacher and the founder of an independent settlement. Rebellions against tyedo domination, his followers swept through Senegambia, burning villages, killing pagans, and enslaving their enemies. Ma Ba himself never actively participated in battle and retired whenever possible from political affairs, but his victories stimulated other Muslim rebellions. The region he had overrun was divided among the Muslim war leaders, who could not unite to establish a stable regime. Lat Dior, the ruler of Cayor from 1871 to 1883, took up the struggle to establish a Muslim state. He was defeated by the French and killed in 1885; despite defeat, the cumulative effect of the Senegambian jihads was the substantial conversion of the Wolof to Islam.

In the jihad period, Islam also spread in the stateless regions of the Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea. The most important campaigns in this region were launched in Guinea by Mout-Ule Sise, educated in Futa Jallon, who gathered bandits, vagrants, and other rootless peoples, built the city of Medina, and launched a jihad in 1835 in the region of Toron and Konya. Defeated and killed in 1841, he was succeeded by a local adventurer named Samory Ture. Samory was born around 1830 of a Dyula family. He served the Medina state, engaged in various local struggles, sometimes on the pagan side, and worked tirelessly to enlarge his personal army. In 1871 he gained control over the Milo River valley, seized Kankan in 1881, and became the principal power holder on the upper Niger. By 1883 he had brought the localchieftains in the territory southwest of ’Umar’s state under his control, and founded the Kingdom of Wasulu.

This new state was governed by Samory and a council of kinsmen and clients who took on the management of the chancellery, the treasury, and administrative justice, religious affairs, and foreign relations. The army was the essential institution. Samory imported horses and weapons and modernized his army along European lines. At first the new state made local chieftains its vassals but after 1878 the conquered territories were organized under military government supported by tribute payments. In the 1880s Samory attempted to convert his regime into an Islamic state. In 1884 he took the title of alamani, opened Muslim schools, forbade the use of alcohol, and required his followers to pray. He destroyed pagan sacred groves and cult symbols and forbade pagan worship. Muslim teachers and holy men were posted as officials in non-Muslim areas to enforce the Shari’a, and defeated peoples were forced to convert to Islam. Dyula traders supported Samory because of his encouragement of commerce, though they did not play a central part in the creation of the state. His Muslim policy, however, eventually led in 1888 to revolts which forced him to tolerate pagan religious associations and cults.

Samory’s would-be Muslim empire was undone by the French, who forced him to move eastward to Upper Volta and the Ivory Coast, where he conquered new territories and set up a new state between 1892 and 1896. In this eastern zone Samory came into conflict with both the French and the British. The French took Sikasso in 1898, and sent Samory into exile, where he died in 1900.

With the defeat of Samory the era of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jihads came to an end. Beginning in the western territories of Mauritania and Senegambia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they had spread throughout Sudanic and Guinean Africa. These movements represented an uprising of Muslim religious teachers and their followers against the military elites. The uprisings, however, took various forms. Most common were the revolts of Fulani pastoral peoples against landowning elites in Bunda, Futa Jallon, Hausaland, Bornu, Fonhm, and other places. In some cases Muslim Fulanis formed coalitions with non-Muslim Fulani clans or with Muslim communities formed of uprooted peoples, former slaves and oppressed peasants. In other cases the jihads represented peasant rebellions. Throughout Senegambia Muslims who opposed the tyedo slave military elite overthrew their masters. In some of the Wolof-inhabited parts of Senegal the Muslim assault overthrew the old social structure and paved the way for massive conversions. In the Volta region, Ivory Coast, and Guinea, Dyula peoples established independent states.

Aroused Muslim populations also provided the support for the expansion of Islam into new regions. The jihad of ’Uthman spilled over into the Chad region and southern Nigeria. Under the leadership of al-Hajj ’Umar torode the lines and Tukolor peoples of Futa Toro carried jihad into the western Sudan. Similarly, Muslims supported the movement of Samory Ture in Guinea. The Muslim mission therefore involved not only local social struggles but wars of expansion and conquest. In certain cases, such as that of Samori in Guinea,
In the first stage of conversion African peoples accepted elements of Islamic culture and practice without forming a Muslim identity. Elements of Islamic material culture including ornaments, dress, food, amulets, and some religious and mythological concepts, became part of the African cultural repertoire. In the second stage formal conversion was achieved and ulama were recognized as the sole representatives of God’s will. The power of communal cults waned and the worship of Allah became supreme. A third stage of Islamization involved changes in conduct and custom as Muslim communities took on Arab Islamic norms. At this stage Muslims recognized the supremacy of Islamic law, worshiped according to the five pillars of Islam, and incorporated Islamic practices into the rituals of circumcision, marriage, and death. Older customs and institutions were reinterpreted in Islamic terms. There also may have been legal and social changes from matrilineal to patrilineal forms of family, and from communal to private ownership of property.

At the very moment when masses of Sudanese peoples were being converted to Islam, Muslim expansion was being checked by European intervention. In the late nineteenth century the French and the British began to assert their own domination. The French took possession of Senegal and of the state founded by Umar in 1893. They then defeated Samori in 1898. The British defeated the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903. The great century of jihad came to an end with the defeat of all the Muslim states and their absorption into European colonial empires.