

IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS: THE CASE OF FRANCIS AMASA WALKER

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Late nineteenth-century influences on American population thought are highlighted by focusing on Francis Amasa Walker's theory of native American fertility decline. Malthusianism, Darwinism, and racism combined to produce a new biological Malthusianism that identified a population calamity more harmful than overpopulation-biological deterioration. The plausibility of Walker's theory is examined with respect to contemporary demographic theory and demographic fact. Its reception by American social scientists is described: acceptance of biological Malthusianism was widespread, and scrutiny of an ideologically useful but empirically untenable theory proved difficult when the social scientific community shared a particular value position.

In a short life-span of fifty-six years, Francis Amasa Walker was a Civil War general, president of the American Economic Association (1885-1892), president of the American Statistical Association (1882-1896), president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1881-1896), and superintendent of the 1870 and 1880 censuses.¹ He is remembered by economists mainly for developments occurring early in his career, when he was a major actor in the revamping of American economics. He introduced statistics into the curriculum and effectively demolished the classic wage-fund theory, a bulwark of laissez faire economics.² His ascendancy to high positions within the profession marked the fall from dominance of the traditionalists. During the 1880s, however, Walker "grew more conservative" as he reacted to changes that threatened the position of old-line Americans, specifically, outbreaks of labor unrest and the influx of large numbers of eastern and southern Europeans.³

This essay focuses on a theory Walker developed during his later "conservative" years, and the reason why he is still remembered by American students of population. In 1891 he explained the native American's small family size: the influx of "inferior" immigrants willing to work for low wages heightened competition, and made the native "unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the world." Practically, this theory fostered a racial nativism that eventually resulted in the discriminatory national origins quota acts of the 1920s.⁴ Intellectually, it exemplified a fusing of Darwinian and racial notions with those of classic Malthusianism that produced a new "biologic" Malthusianism. From Walker's time until the 1930s, the effect of demographic change on the biological quality of the population was a focal point of American population research. In fact, during this period of heightened racial and class anxiety, predictions of retrogression and doom were common,⁵ leading many to point to the declining proportion of Nordics or Anglo-Saxons and to appeal to prejudice to prove race degradation. Because Walker's theory offered an explanation of a widely known demographic trend, it was both of great

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policy import and amenable to empirical scrutiny. Its acceptance by many American social scientists *without* such scrutiny, however, illustrates the power of race and class to subvert the scientific method.

A BIOLOGIC MALTHUSIANISM

Malthus wrote his *Essay on Population* in 1798, and for the next century population theorizing took place largely within a Malthusian framework.⁶ This was true even in America, the country Malthus used to illustrate a population's ability to increase geometrically when encountering no shortage of resources. The lack of any subsistence check to population growth prompted a "debate" to develop among American students of population. Anti-Malthusians questioned whether the availability of subsistence actually did limit population growth, while Malthusians considered America's twenty-five year doubling time an unusual and temporary condition, the exception proving the Malthusian rule.⁷ Nonetheless, early in the century all were measuring the nation's progress by its rate of population increase, and American discussions of Malthus had a decidedly abstract quality about them.⁸ Some, like John Adams, were led to belittle the theory's significance.⁹

Two actual population trends, however, did capture the attention of Americans: fertility decline and immigration. Ever since the 1800 census, white fertility showed a continual decline. In 1843 George Tucker related fertility decline to urbanization and a rising standard of living: "Checks to natural multiplication, those arising from prudence or pride, will continue to operate with increased force as our cities multiply in number and increase in magnitude, and as the wealthy class enlarges."¹⁰ This "standard of living" explanation conformed to basic Malthusian premises. The middle and upper classes, Malthus argued, delayed marriage and limited their childbearing to protect their standard of living. Though his gloomy forecast of the mass of mankind living in poverty as population continually pressed against the means of subsistence arose from his belief that the lower classes were not likely to exercise such "moral restraint," nineteenth-century American political economists came to be more optimistic on this point. They believed that a rising standard of living was inducing ever larger proportions of the population to act "prudently" in their reproductive behavior.¹¹

Walker accepted this "standard of living" explanation early in his career though adding negative undertones to it.¹² As late as 1889, just two years prior to proclaiming his new theory, he still made no reference to immigration when explaining fertility decline: "It was the change from the simplicity of the early time to comparative luxury, including a rise in the standard of living, the multiplication of artificial necessities, the rapid extension of a paid domestic service, the increasing introduction of women into factory labor, the substitution of the hotel and boarding-house for the self-sufficing, self-contained family, which, in the main, constituted the retarding force It was all the natural result of the changed social and economic conditions under which the American people had come to live."¹³ His novel theory, therefore, was not the result of slow accretion, but of sudden conversion.

The second population trend attracting attention was immigration. In the 1840s over one and a half million immigrants, nearly three times the number of the preceding decade, arrived in America. Most were destitute peasants fleeing starvation in Ireland. Opposition to mid-century immigration was quick to develop. Focusing on their poverty and their Catholicism, the Know-Nothing movement harnessed political support for stopping the flow.¹⁴ In 1856 Samuel Busey juxtaposed the immigrants' high fertility with

the decreasing fertility of the native population, arguing not that their influx caused the decline, but that it threatened to change the American character.¹⁵ But political economists of the time tended to find few economic difficulties with immigration. Amasa Walker, Francis's father and a renowned political economist, contended that the immigrants' labor was being put to productive use, that the nation's aggregate wealth was being enhanced, and that native wages were being "improved rather than injured." He reasoned that since "the general intelligence and enterprise of the native population are far in advance" to those of the newcomers, immigrants would become factory workers while natives would become managers.¹⁶ Nathan Allen, a New England physician, took this tack when he explicitly related native fertility decline to immigration. Immigrants pushed the native American up the class structure. Native women no longer performed domestic chores; female immigrant servants did them. Native men no longer performed manual labor; male immigrants did the heavy work. This upward mobility, he argued, was accompanied by changes in tastes and habits that led to small families.¹⁷

As the century drew to a close a new population concern arose: Robert Porter, superintendent of the 1890 census, heralded the end of the frontier.¹⁸ In a "filled" America, Malthusianism lost its hypothetical quality. Students of population were quick to apply standard Malthusian assumptions in their analyses of American population trends. With no frontier, an expanding population would lead to an era of declining marginal returns as resources became more scarce and costly.¹⁹ Francis Walker used the passing of the frontier to argue that immigration had changed from being a positive to a negative factor in the nation's development: "There was a time, a long time, when every able-bodied man coming to our shores, however poor and even however ignorant, if not vicious or criminal, brought an added strength to the young nation. The more came, the more there was for all and for each. A continent was to be wrested from savage nature, was to be annexed, occupied, cultivated; and every one's help was welcome in the great work." He went on to note, however, that "to-day, the tracts of public land worth taking up under the homestead and preemption acts are few and far between." With the closing of the frontier, "a labor-problem is at last upon us." He contended that in this new environment, large numbers of poor immigrants only heightened competition and lowered the standard of living of the native worker.²⁰

Initially, Richmond Mayo-Smith, professor of political economy at Columbia University, presented an analysis of unrestricted immigration's impact on native fertility that extrapolated from the accepted "standard of living" explanation of fertility decline. For him, "the ideal sort of population is not one that increases with enormous rapidity. It is one where there is a small number of births, a small number of deaths, and a long average life, and where the people are kept in good health and strength. Such an ideal population can exist only where there is a high standard of living, where there is prudence and self-restraint, and where there is the hope that the position of children may be better than that of the fathers." Unrestricted immigration increased competition between native and immigrant, and worked to lower the standard of living of the native. This made "prudential restraint" less likely among the native working class: "It is difficult at the best to induce a population to adopt the prudential restraint, — to refrain from getting married, and having children unless there is a reasonable prospect that their children will be able to maintain themselves in the same habits of life as their parents, — but a continuous immigration removes even that possibility, for the place which would have been taken by the children is now taken by the foreigner. Every reward for self-restraint and prudence is thus taken away."²¹ Unrestricted immigration was a menace because

it threatened to end fertility decline among native Americans. Although conforming with accepted demographic theory, Mayo-Smith's analysis attracted little attention and no followers. Nor did he repeat it in his classic 1890 treatise, *Emigration and Immigration*.²²

American population specialists had begun responding to a new Malthusianism, one that identified a population calamity more harmful than overpopulation: biological deterioration. During the nineteenth century, classic Malthusianism had mixed with Darwinian and racist elements. Darwin took Malthus's idea that superfluous reproduction provoked a fight for survival and used it to explain biological change.²³ Belief that competition and natural selection produced beneficial change had become nearly universal among educated Americans.²⁴ Many linked evolutionary notions with the racial theories that presumed a hierarchy of races then coming into vogue. John Fiske, for example, was an early advocate of Spencerian and Darwinian thought who went on to popularize Anglo-Saxon racism and to help establish the Teutonist historical school in America. Academics, overwhelmingly of north-western European heritage, found "scientific" theories identifying Teutons, Anglo-Saxons or Nordics as the superior race particularly captivating.²⁵

Out of this mix of ideas, a biologic Malthusianism emerged that differed significantly from the classic sort. With class and race being used as surrogate measures of genetic quality, changes in a population's racial and class composition assumed a supreme importance. The low fertility of the native American and the influx of prolific and "inferior" peoples came to be viewed as a biological catastrophe: a regressive evolutionary process. The inverse relationship between class and fertility that was understandable from the vantage point of classic Malthusianism, became devastating and unacceptable.²⁶ Beginning with Galton, who took Darwin's idea of natural selection and proposed the process be aided through science to breed a superior human species, plans to correct this noxious imbalance were fashioned.²⁷

The vision of a "filled" America facing resource limitations that emerged at the end of the century, therefore, did not produce calls for policies that would simply slow growth: ending immigration and encouraging fertility decline.²⁸ Most American students of population adopted biologic Malthusianism, and refused to advocate any activity that might lower the fertility of native couples. They did not oppose the Comstock Laws that made the distribution of contraceptive information and devices illegal, fearing that "prudent and thoughtful" natives would disproportionately avail themselves of birth control.²⁹ Instead, they first fought to prohibit the "sub-common representatives of certain unachieving and indistinguished strains" from gaining entrance to America, and later allied themselves with eugenicists to work for higher fertility from the biologically fit and lower fertility from the unfit.³⁰

Walker, born of yeoman English colonial stock, responded to America's changing demographic reality in an exemplary biologic Malthusian manner. Captivated by racial theorizing, he started with Teutonism and evolved a version of Anglo-Saxon racism that attempted to explain America's singular superiority in evolutionary terms:

There is no reason to suppose that otherwise than through coming predominately from the intelligent and virtuous middle class of the old country, constituting thus a picked body from which were, in a great measure, excluded the weak, the vicious, the effeminate persons of dwarfed stature, tainted blood and imperfect organization, the first settlers of New England possessed any superiority in the quality under consideration over the English people in general. It was to their experiences,

extending through many generations, upon this inhospitable shore, that their descendants were to owe the development of a mechanical faculty which was to place them as far ahead of the English as the English are ahead of any other branch of the Teutonic race; as the Teutonic race are ahead of the Slavic or the Celtic.³¹

Having such a racial definition of the American character made it difficult to acquiesce to the surge in immigration of Slavs, Jews, and Italians that began in the 1880s.³² He regarded their impoverished conditions as evolutionary proof of racial inferiority and foresaw assimilation problems:

They have none of the inherited instincts and tendencies which made it comparatively easy to deal with the immigration of the olden time. They are beaten men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence . . . They have none of the ideas and aptitudes which fit men to take up readily and easily the problem of self-care and self-government, such as belong to those who are descended from the tribes that met under the oak-trees of old Germany to make laws and choose chieftains.³³

Speaking at Lehigh University in 1887, he blamed America's expanding labor problems on the influx of "vast hordes of brutalized peasants" coming from "countries comparatively new to our immigration statistics." A detailed probe of shifting migration streams, however, awaited the appearance of his 1891 *Forum* article, in which he proposed his novel theory of native fertility decline.³⁴

WALKER'S THEORY

In the *Forum* article Walker related nineteenth-century immigration and fertility trends. Massive immigration "checked the disposition of the native toward the increase of population at the traditional rate." In those "north-eastern and northern middle States" into which immigrants "poured in such numbers"

Our people had to look upon houses that were mere shells for human habitations, the gate unhung, the shutters flapping or falling, green pools in the yard, babes and young children rolling about half naked or worse, neglected, dirty, unkempt. Was there not in this, sentimental reason strong enough to give a shock to the principle of population? But there was, besides, an economic reason for a check to the native increase. The American shrank from the industrial competition thus thrust upon him. He was unwilling himself to engage in the lowest kind of day labor with these new elements of the population; he was even more unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the world to enter into that competition.

Immigration, instead of adding to the US population, only replaced native Americans with immigrants: "That if the foreigners had not come, the native element would long have filled the places the foreigners usurped, I entertain not a doubt."³⁵ Although this "displacement" notion had a long history in American population thought, Walker seemed unaware of earlier versions.³⁶

He offered a "coincidence" of statistics to support his theory. Early in the century, during a period of minimal immigration, Elkanah Watson had made a set of population projections based upon the simple assumption of a constant rate of growth, the one present from 1790 to 1810. The decennial rate of increase in population from 1820 through the 1850s actually stayed quite close to Watson's prediction, even though immigration increased fourfold from the 1820s to the 1830s, and then nearly tripled again to 1,713,000 during the next decade. Why had the rate of population remained constant in the face of such substantial immigration?

Walker thought there were three possible answers: mere coincidence, the vacant places left by a decline in native fertility attracted foreigners to fill them; or, native Americans restricted their fertility in response to the influx of foreigners. Walker found the great accuracy of Watson's projections (coming within 50,000 of the actual 1840 and 1850 census counts) too improbable an occurrence to have happened by coincidence. Nor could he imagine, considering the state of trans-oceanic communication and transportation, how foreign peasantries would "know" the exact number of spaces that could be filled each decade by a fall in native rates. This left only the third possibility. He noted that "decline in the native element . . . occurred chiefly in just those regions to which the newcomers most freely resorted." And with the rise of immigration to over 5,250,000 for 1880-1890, and "with no assurance that this number may not be doubled in the current decade," Walker called for restriction to preserve "the nation's birthright."³⁷

By 1896 Walker was so convinced that unrestricted immigration was the major reason behind nineteenth-century native American fertility decline that he attacked the traditional "standard of living" argument that was to be found in nearly every political economy text (including the latest edition of his own).³⁸

Is the proposition that the arrival of foreigners brought a check to the native increase a reasonable one? . . . I answer, Yes It has been said by some that during this time habits of luxury were entering, to reduce both the disposition and the ability to increase among our own population. In some small degree, in some restricted localities, this undoubtedly was the case; but prior to 1860 there was no such general growth of luxury in the United States as is competent to account for the effect seen. Indeed, I believe this was almost wholly due to the cause which has been indicated.³⁹

THE PLAUSIBILITY OF WALKER'S THEORY

The empirical justification Walker provided for his theory was remarkably meager, especially considering his access to census data and his acknowledged skill as a statistician. From 1790 to 1860 the nation expanded significantly in geographic size as new states entered the union, yet he did not consider this factor's possible impact on the nation's decennial rates of population increase. Although he asserted that native fertility decline was greatest in those areas receiving the most foreign immigrants, he provided no documentation. Nor did he divide the nation into regions experiencing high and low levels of immigration to see if their patterns of native population increase were different. He also failed to seek out consistencies and inconsistencies between rates of change in immigration and rates of change in population increase. Walker's failure to conduct appropriate statistical analyses raised doubts about the theory's validity.⁴⁰

Even the "coincidence of statistics" that Walker did use was suspect. In 1891 he commended the accuracy of Watson's projections, yet in 1873 he had belittled Watson's methodology, explicitly objecting to Watson's assumption of a constant rate of growth. In that earlier year Walker attributed the accuracy of Watson's 1820-1860 predictions to blind "luck," and asserted that Watson's predictions for the remaining decades of the century would considerably overestimate the population growth of a nation that had begun "to leave agriculture for manufacturing pursuits."⁴¹ After 1860 the rate of overall population growth actually did decline even as the pace of immigration picked up. Yet, for some reason in 1891 Walker decided to end his comparison between Watson's projections and actual census results in 1860, the last year for which a "remarkable accuracy" was evident.⁴² Perhaps this was because treating post-1860 demographic trends

would raise doubts about his contention that each immigrant displaced a native birth. One would have to believe that over five million native births were stifled by immigration during the 1880s, a decade during which the entire population increased by less than thirteen million. One would have to believe that if ten million immigrants were to come in the 1890s, as Walker feared, almost no native couple would bear a child during that decade. Even as stated, there was a fantastic element in Walker's "coincidence of statistics": how could American couples possibly have "known" the precise number of births to forego so as to exactly compensate for the number of arriving immigrants during each decade from 1820 to 1860?

Walker's theory corresponded poorly with known fertility patterns. In 1843 Tucker had calculated that the white birth rate had continuously declined since 1790, including during the decades when immigration was insignificant.⁴³ In 1891 Oswald Ottendorfer observed that fertility decline is "especially noticed among the wealthier classes who never dream that their children have ever to compete with foreigners in the market for labor." Since the living standards of all classes had been increasing for some time, Ottendorfer called it a "mistake" to believe that "the reluctance of our native population to bring forth sons and daughters is due to the fear that they would have to compete in the market for labor with hordes of immigrants, whose customs are repulsive to them and who are lowering the standard of living."⁴⁴ Walker never did document a decline in the living standard of the native working class or even a specific decline in its fertility. Walker also never dealt with other anomalies that questioned his theory's validity. For instance, in "The Colored Race in the United States" Walker, documenting the US black population's shrinking decennial rate of increase (from 37.5% for 1800-1810 to 13.9% for 1880-1890), never explained why the low-wage population of the South had a lower rate of population growth than the higher-wage population. Nor did he offer a reason why the presence of a low-wage black population had not brought about significant fertility decline among Southern whites.⁴⁵

There was actually little demographic need for Walker's theory. Fertility trends were beginning to be subjected to increasingly sophisticated analysis. John Billings, for instance, analyzed 1880 and 1890 US census data as well as international statistics and documented that the birth rate had recently fallen most rapidly in agricultural states, particularly in the South and among the black population, and least rapidly in the Northeastern states. He also noted that they had fallen throughout much of Europe. The fall, he thought, was due to "the deliberate and voluntary avoidance or prevention of child-bearing on the part of an increasing number of married people, who not only prefer to have few children, but who know how to obtain their wish." Changing women's roles and a rising standard of living were seen as fostering small family norms. Young women were "being imbued with the idea that marriage and motherhood are not to be their chief objects in life," that they "should aim at being independent of possible or actual husbands," and that "housekeeping is a sort of domestic slavery" which should be replaced by "remunerative employment." The "great increase in the use of things which were formerly considered as luxuries, but which now have become almost necessities" led married couples "to have fewer children in order that they may be each better provided for."⁴⁶ Billings made no mention of immigration in his interpretation.

The trends Billings noted implied that a general process of fertility decline was underway in all industrializing societies. It was spreading throughout Europe, and in the United States, where it began earlier, it infiltrated to the rural South by the 1880s. Walker's identification of immigration as the major factor in native fertility decline could make

little sense of such trends. Very few immigrants in the 1880s were making their way to Southern states, and no European country had experienced significant immigration. Identifying urbanization and industrialization as the factors most responsible for declining fertility made many fertility differentials understandable. For instance, high fertility immigrant groups gave birth to children whose fertility dropped dramatically, often to levels approaching that of the native population.⁴⁷ Since immigrants had overwhelmingly chosen to settle in large industrial cities, their children were more likely to live in cities, to be employed in non-agricultural jobs, and to have lower fertility than the general population. Walker and his advocates could only develop strained explanations of this dramatic decline: the offspring of Irish immigrants lowered their fertility because they found themselves competing with newly arriving Italians and Slavs more impoverished than they.⁴⁸ They never documented downward pressure on Irish-American living standards, however, and simply used the low fertility of the second generation to "prove" that increased competition existed. Such circular reasoning demonstrated more an unwillingness to be dissuaded than effective theorizing.

There also were problems with Walker's theory on the more abstract level. As evolutionary theory, it made little sense. Fitness could be measured objectively, by survival rates. A "superior" race being supplanted by an "inferior" race as a result of competition contradicted basic Darwinian premises. The success that dimwitted and degenerate groups had competing economically and reproductively with superior native Americans needed a non-evolutionary explanation. Walker and other restrictionists attributed it to the benevolence of the natives. Their high level of civilization had produced an elevated sensibility that made generosity second nature to them. Only a clear awareness of the true Darwinian principles could curb such destructive benevolence. Walker preached: "it is never to be forgotten that self-defense is the first law of nature and of nations. If that man who careth not for his own household is worse than an infidel, the nation which permits its institutions to be endangered by any cause which can fairly be removed is guilty not less in Christian than in natural law."⁴⁹ Leaving an open door to inferior peoples was misplaced, destructive, and unnatural. In what could be a rationale for both the restrictionist movement and the later eugenics movement, Mayo-Smith contended that: "the state is often obliged to interfere in the process of natural selection in order to make sure that the really fittest survive."⁵⁰ Calls for state intervention to end competition and cryptic definitions of "fitness," however, made for an incoherent evolutionary theory.

Walker's theory also had problems as economic theory. His "end of the frontier" analysis had America entering into an era of pressure of population on resources, of Malthusian overpopulation. Yet his policy recommendation of restricting immigration was not directed at reducing overpopulation. Ending immigration would lead, he hoped, to a resurgence of native American fertility, not to a reduction in population growth. Thus, Walker's compositional concerns clearly confounded his Malthusian analysis. In general, the racial focus of biologic Malthusianism was not easily integrated into the discipline of economics. Contending that individuals ought to behave in ways that benefit race, unsettled nearly all the axioms of a field built on the assumption that individuals act in a utilitarian manner, maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain.⁵¹ Walker, for instance, wished to revert "to when an able bodied and industrious laboring man could, with the exertion of all his powers, hardly provide the barest means of subsistence for himself and his family," if such a reversion would end the allure America had for "degraded" immigrants.⁵² Such a recommendation was incomprehensible in economic terms.

THE RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF WALKER'S THEORY

Despite its flaws, Walker's theory was quickly and, for the most part, uncritically accepted. It provided the Immigration Restriction League with a potent rationale for its racially based opposition to immigration. With its replacement of the "good" old by the "degenerate" new theme, it resonated with the nascent eugenics movement. With its call for state action to alleviate social ills, it touched on the progressive strain of reformers. In many ways it was both the harbinger and the cornerstone of an era of biologic Malthusianism, of heightened concern over race and class issues. The reiteration of Walker's theory began in the 1890s and continued through the 1920s.⁵³

Walker's ideas mobilized popular support for immigration restriction, especially among the educated elite, in ways that had not happened before. In the spring of 1894 the Immigration Restriction League was formed by a group of recent Harvard graduates, led by Prescott Farnsworth Hall and Robert DeCourcy Ward.⁵⁴ Both made use of Walker's theory in a most polemical way. Hall used it to liken immigration to genocidal infanticide: "the main point is that the native children are murdered by never being allowed to come into existence, as surely as if put to death in some older invasion of the Huns and Vandals."⁵⁵ Ward exploited its racial dimension: "The question is a race question, pure and simple. . . . It is fundamentally a question as to what kind of babies shall be born; it is a question as to what races shall dominate in this country."⁵⁶ Edward Alsworth Ross boosted the political potency of the theory by labeling it "race suicide," a term which President Theodore Roosevelt adopted and gave wide currency by adding that it was "the greatest problem of civilization" since it resulted in "the elimination instead of the survival of the fittest."⁵⁷

Walker's use of Darwinism and Teutonism proved fortuitous. At the turn of the century, the rediscovery of Mendel's research and the power of Weismann's contentions led many to believe that science had proven heredity's transcendent role in molding human destiny. Lamarckian beliefs about the inheritability of acquired characteristics were discredited, and the significance of race greatly enhanced. A Eugenics Section of the American Breeders Association was formed in 1906, largely by natural scientists, marking the formal establishment of the American eugenics movement. Its goal was "to emphasize the value of superior blood and the menace to society of inferior blood."⁵⁸ As a result, demographic trends assumed an ominous importance to eugenicists. They, like Walker, were firmly convinced that the new immigrants were innately inferior and that immediate intervention in the nation's population dynamics was needed to prevent a biological catastrophe.⁵⁹ In 1908 the Eugenics Section established an Immigration Committee to end the flow of "defective germ plasm" into the country. Restrictionists and eugenicists shared a biologic Malthusianism, and increasingly overlapped in policies and personnel.⁶⁰ In fact, immigration restriction was considered a form of eugenics: "some advanced persons are talking of regulating marriage with a view to the elimination of those unfit for other purposes than mere survival; yet most people fail to realize that here in the United States we have a unique opportunity, through our power to regulate immigration, of exercising artificial selection upon an enormous scale."⁶¹

During the early decades of this century, many progressives concerned with the nation's urban problems and social workers dealing with the problems of the nation's poor were attracted to biologic Malthusianism.⁶² Richard Dugdale's classic study of family degeneracy, *The Jukes* (1877), paved the way for thoroughly hereditarian treatments of the theme, such as Henry Goddard's *The Kallikak Family*.⁶³ Convinced

by such genealogical studies that the source of poverty could be found in inferior genes, they looked to immigration restriction and eugenics for solutions. Even Margaret Sanger, who began her career as a socialist espousing the need for birth control among the masses, was a fervent eugenicist by the 1920s. She contended that the national origins quota acts did not go far enough in controlling "the quality of our population." To "cut down the rapid multiplication of the unfit and undesirable at home," she called for government pensions for inferior couples who would undergo sterilization.⁶⁴ Walker's theory made its way into the standard social welfare texts of the time as well: "It seems unquestionable that the unfittest class of immigrants that have ever come to our shores is increasing yearly in numbers. We may and should be willing to permit our native stock to be annihilated by a superior people; but it is inconceivable that we should knowingly promote, by conscious act, an intermarrying and intermingling of peoples, which will indefinitely lower the standard of American or any other manhood."⁶⁵

Twenty years after Walker first formulated the theory, Henry Pratt Fairchild, later to be elected the first president of the Population Association of America, presented an unmodified version of it. The native worker limited "the size of his family to preserve his standard of living" because "already certain classes of work are commonly known as 'Dago labor,' others as 'Hunkie labor,' and a self-respecting American parent saddens at the thought of his children entering them."⁶⁶ The first volume of *Reports of the Immigration Commission* (1911) noted "there is ground for argument or speculation" that "less immigration of a character tending to keep down wages and working conditions might have been attended by a larger natural increase among the native-born portion of the population." As early as 1909 Census publications were dividing the white population into native ("those with ancestors at the First Census") and "foreign stock," and estimation procedures were being devised to determine the proportion of each in the current population.⁶⁷ Restrictionists were continually honing their legislative proposals to increase their appeal, and the mechanics of the eventual national origins quota acts were being developed.

There was opposition to restriction and there were critiques of Walker's theory. Walter Willcox, Cornell University statistician and advisor to the Census, provided much of the evidence used to question Walker's theory, although he himself did not oppose restriction. His reconstruction of nineteenth-century fertility trends from census data found evidence of a decline as early as 1810, well before the onset of substantial immigration. Although never rejecting Walker's theory, he questioned its adequacy. Isaac A. Hourwich and E. A. Goldenweiser, scholars with "new" ethnic origins, used Willcox's evidence in open attacks on the theory. They proceeded to empirically question all its central assumptions. That areas with the greatest number of immigrants tended to be those with greatest fertility decline among the native born, was simply due to the tendency of immigrants to settle in cities; both declining fertility and immigration were consequences of nineteenth-century industrialization and urbanization.⁶⁸ These quite competent critiques, however, converted no restrictionists and had little effect on the public's exposure to Walker's theory.⁶⁹

Indeed proliferation of many forms of biologic Malthusianism during the early decades of this century indicates a general receptivity to the viewpoint. Eugenicists succeeded in having states pass eugenic sterilization laws that authorized the involuntary sterilization of the "feeble-minded" and other "defectives."⁷⁰ As early as 1888 both Edward Bemis and Mayo-Smith studied and reported the high rates of insanity, poverty, and criminality found among new immigrants.⁷¹ This strategy of proving racial inferiority by reference to increasingly detailed government statistics had produced a mass of findings

regarding immigrants by the early decades of the twentieth century: high rates of imprisonment and insanity; low scores on Army intelligence tests; small cranial capacities, etc.⁷² Significant numbers of American social scientists participated in this enterprise. And considering much of the "evidence" was due to faulty analysis and questionable interpretation, such defective scholarship is a measure of the strength of biologic Malthusianism. The passage of national origins quota acts that explicitly discriminated against eastern and southern Europeans is, perhaps, the clearest manifestation of this strength and of its widespread public acceptance.

What might account for the distressingly few social scientists who critically examined Walker's theory, a theory of such great policy import?⁷³ A. M. Carr-Saunders, a British demographer, speculated in 1936 that: "It is only possible to explain the prevalence of a theory so contrary to common sense and so lacking in factual support by supposing that it is used as a ready-made argument with a respectable ancestry wherewith to attack freedom of entry, which is disliked for reasons that cannot be conveniently disclosed."⁷⁴ During the early decades of this century many American social scientists were of native extraction. The social changes which Walker found so disturbing, similarly affected them. Walker's fears were their fears, and his theory offered them reassurance. Its biologic Malthusianism allowed them to assert their superiority, and to claim that science confirmed it. It allowed them to act in ways that protected their interest, and to claim that they were furthering the commonweal. Walker's theory was an exegesis of native American problems and a rallying cry for action. Treating it disinterestedly, as a simple theory of fertility decline, was difficult to do.

CONCLUSION

The belief that unrestricted immigration had caused native fertility decline in the nineteenth century was difficult to reconcile with either existing demographic theory or demographic fact, but ideologically it was quite useful. Race degeneration was the paramount concern of the new biologic Malthusianism, which posited two "scourges" as the cause: declining fertility of native Americans and immigration of inferior races. Classic Malthusian interpretations of the relationship between fertility decline and immigration led to perplexing policy recommendations. Allen, for instance, saw the new immigration as "pushing" the native up the class structure and thereby causing downward fertility. From the vantage point of biologic Malthusianism, the race suffered, but the individual benefitted. Mayo-Smith's initial analysis, too, was problematic. He implied that continued unrestricted immigration would stimulate native fertility even while it impoverished the native. The race benefitted, but the individual suffered. Only Walker's explanation regarded unrestricted immigration as both an economic problem and the cause of the native's declining fertility. Hence, an unequivocal policy recommendation: eliminating one "scourge" to enhance both native fertility and economic well-being.

Some have argued that Walker's theory was partially valid since immigration, by stimulating the upward mobility of the native, might have fostered native fertility decline.⁷⁵ They, however, misconstrue Walker's theory. Walker resolutely contended that America had "a labor problem" and that immigration was lowering, not raising, the native's standard of living. Immigration would continue, he claimed, until no "difference of economic level exists between our population and that of the most degraded communities abroad."⁷⁶ The upward mobility explanation might have a firmer empirical and theoretical basis in population studies, but it was not Walker's theory. Such an explanation would have very limited utility for a restrictionist: persuading people of the need to end a source of upward mobility was too difficult a task.

By framing the issue in racial terms and by claiming that immigration lowered the general American living standard, the dubious demography of Walker's actual theory was revealed to be an ideological marvel, a "two-edged sword of racial and economic attack upon the tradition of free immigration."⁷⁷ It worked to defuse a potentially problematic class issue.⁷⁸ Farmers, factory workers, shopkeepers and mill owners would undoubtedly be affected quite differently by restricting immigration. Yet Walker's theory allowed restrictionists to claim that all "natives" had a common interest in closing the door: "To put the matter concretely, the greatest danger of unselected immigration is its effect upon the native birth rate."⁷⁹ Once race replaced class, consensus was possible. By claiming that the actions of the inferior were causing the demise of the superior, Walker's theory invoked and enhanced the appeal of biologic Malthusian thought. Native couples were not responsible for their deficient fertility, native workers were not responsible for their economic failures, and the higher classes were not responsible for the conditions of the poor. The new immigrants were responsible for all these ills, and preventing their entry would remedy them.

In the end Walker's theory can best be understood not as a scientific explanation of a demographic trend, but as an ideological construct designed to allay the fears of old-stock Americans who felt threatened by change. Walker imparted a form to an amorphous menace, provided a means of reconstructing a crumbling social order, and gave hope for the future. The fabrication of a theory in such discord with past developments in population studies illustrates the distinctive concerns that developed among educated native Americans in the late nineteenth century. The acceptance of a theory with such negligible empirical support illustrates the inherent appeal that biologic Malthusianism had for many in the social scientific community. It also illustrates the frailty of relying on the possibility of empirical disproof to ensure validity. Ultimately, when the bulk of such a community shares a particular value position, rigorous scrutiny of an ideologically useful but empirically untenable theory is unlikely.

NOTES

1. For a reverential view of Walker's life see James P. Munroe's biography, *A Life of Francis Amasa Walker* (New York: Henry Holt, 1923). For a treatment of Walker's important contributions to economics see Bernard Newton, *The Economics of Francis Walker: American Economics in Transition* (New York: Kelley, 1968).
2. The wage-fund doctrine contended that the average worker's wage was determined by the ratio of the number of workers to a fixed amount of money, a percentage of the employer's capital. Worker efforts to organize and gain higher wages, therefore, could not succeed since such actions did not affect the amount of money in the "wage-fund." Walker argued that employers actually paid wages based upon their assessment of the value of the product being produced, not the value of their capital. See Walker, *The Wages Question* (New York: Henry Holt, 1876). For treatments of Walker's role during the transitional period in American economics see: Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), pp. 121-123; and Mary O. Furner, *Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865-1905* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), pp. 39-48.
3. See Joseph Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization*, Vol. 3 (New York: Viking, 1949), pp. 107-108, for a treatment of Walker's growing conservatism. For a specific treatment of Walker's reaction to the "new" immigrants, see Barbara Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 69-81.
4. John Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 142-148, thinks Walker exerted "a more telling intellectual influence" on the development of a racial nativism than either Henry Cabot Lodge or Nathaniel S. Shaler. Mark H. Haller, *Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Social Thought* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. 54, identifies Walker's theory as "the first major impetus" in the generation of that nativism, since it "put into figures the fear that already gnawed at many Americans of native stock" and gave them substance.

5. Popular examples of this pessimistic literature are: Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1916); Theodore Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1920) and *Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under Man* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1922).
6. Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 578.
7. Joseph J. Spengler, "Population Doctrines in the United States, I: Anti-Malthusianism," "Population Doctrines in the United States, II: Malthusianism," *Journal of Political Economy* 41 (1933): 433-467, 639-672.
8. See George Tucker, "On The Future Destiny of the United States" and "On the Theory of Malthus," in his *Essays on Various Subjects of Taste, Morals, and National Policy, by a Citizen of Virginia* (Georgetown, D.C.: Joseph Milligan, 1822), pp. 1-24 and pp. 305-336; and Henry Carey's treatment of Malthus and America's capacity for population increase in *Principles of Political Economy*, Vol. 3 (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard, 1840), pp. 47-52.
9. "That the first want of man is his dinner, and the second his girl, were truths well known to every democrat and aristocrat, long before the great philosopher Malthus arose, to think he enlightened the world by the discovery." John Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, Vol. 6, edited by Charles Francis Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1856), p. 516.
10. George Tucker, *The Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth in Fifty Years, as Exhibited by the Decennial Census* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1843), p. 103.
11. See Edward Prince Hutchinson, *The Population Debate: The Development of Conflicting Theories Up to 1900* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 317-318.
12. Francis A. Walker, "Our Population in 1900," *Atlantic Monthly* 32 (1873), p. 494: "As the line of agricultural occupation draws closer to the great barren plains; as the older Western States change more and more to manufactures and to commerce; as the manufacturing and commercial communities of the East become compacted; as the whole population tends increasingly to fashion and social observance; as diet, dress, and equipage become more and more artificial; and as the detestable American vice of 'boarding,' making children truly 'encumbrances,' and uprooting the ancient and honored institutions of the family, extends from city to city and from village to village, — it is not to be doubted that we shall note a steady decline in the rate of the national increase from decade to decade."
13. Francis A. Walker, "The Growth of the Nation in Numbers, Territory and the Elements of Industrial Power," *Providence Journal* (19 June 1889): 3. William Petersen noted the sharp break between Walker's "early" and "late" explanations of declining native fertility in *The Politics of Population* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 198-200.
14. David H. Bennett, *The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 105-155.
15. Samuel C. Busey, *Immigration: Its Evils and Consequences* (New York: De Witt & Davenport, 1856), pp. 82-89.
16. Amasa Walker, *The Science of Wealth*, Student's Edition (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1872), pp. 441-442.
17. Nathan Allen, "Changes in New England Population," *Popular Science Monthly* 23 (1883): 441-442. Allen had developed an unusual theory in which behavioral changes, especially in women, cause physiological changes that reduce fecundity; see "The Law of Human Increase; or, Population Based on Physiology and Psychology," *Quarterly Journal of Psychological Medicine* 2 (1868): 209-266.
18. See Margo J. Anderson, *The American Census: A Social History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 84-86; and Gerald Nash, "The Census of 1890 and the Closing of the Frontier," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 71 (1980): 98-100.
19. Richmond Mayo-Smith began such treatments in 1888, see "Control of Immigration II," *Political Science Quarterly* 3 (1888): 218-225. They continued right up through the 1910s: Frank Fetter, "Population or Prosperity," *American Economic Review* 3, March Supplement (1913): 5-19; Warren Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1915); and Edward Dana Durand, "Some Problems of Population Growth," *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association* 15 (1916): 129-148. These later treatments attributed the sluggish growth of the American standard of living to the population reaching Malthusian limits.
20. Francis A. Walker, "Immigration," *Yale Review* 1 (1892): 126, 129, 136-137.
21. Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration II," p. 203.
22. *Emigration and Immigration: A Study in Social Science* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890). In this work Mayo-Smith simply never dealt with the impact of immigration on native fertility. He described (pp. 143-146) a local process of "substitution" of native labor by "low standard of living" immigrant labor that was similar to Walker's theory, yet he contended (pp. 57-58) that immigration added significantly to the overall population.

23. Darwin's attribution of his theory of natural selection to a reading of Malthus is well known: Charles Darwin, *Life and Letters*, Vol. 1, edited by Francis Darwin (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1887), p. 68.
24. The classic work on this development is Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915*; see also Robert C. Bannister, *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979) for an argument that minimizes the presence of Social Darwinism, rigorously defined, in American thought.
25. See Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, pp. 127-136. She noted that from the 1890s to the 1920s most American social scientists were native born, inclined to believe in Anglo-Saxon superiority, and were supporters of immigration restriction.
26. With biologic Malthusianism, the consequence of population dynamics that assumes greatest importance is its impact on the biological quality of a population, not its impact on the prosperity of a people. Biologic Malthusianism was not an exclusively American phenomenon. Very similar concerns arose in Great Britain at the time, see Richard A. Soloway, *Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in Twentieth Century Britain* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). With Britain's greater racial homogeneity and lower rates of immigration, biologic Malthusian concerns focused more exclusively on the higher fertility rates of the lower classes. In America these qualitative concerns revolved around both immigration and differential fertility, see Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, pp. 134-157.
27. Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences* (London: Macmillan, 1869).
28. Louis R. Harley did present such a consistent policy position in "The Doctrine of Malthus as It Relates to Modern Society," *American Magazine of Civics* 6 (1895): 13-20. He argued for immigration restriction and for increasing the economic independence of women in order to reduce their fertility. His was a lonely voice.
29. See R. F. Clarke, "Neo-Malthusianism," *North American Review* 163 (1896): 345-361. Dennis Hodgson, "Ideological Origins of the Population Association of America," *Population and Development Review* 17 (1991): 1-34, examines the biologic Malthusian stance taken by American students of population toward the birth control movement at that time.
30. The quote is from Edward Alsworth Ross, "Comments on Husband's Paper, 'The Significance of Emigration,'" *American Economic Review* 2, March Supplement (1912): 87. For the later alliance of American students of population with the eugenics movement see Linda Gordon, "The Politics of Population: Birth Control and the Eugenics Movement," *Radical American* 8 (1974): 61-74; James Reed, *From Private Vice to Public Virtue: The Birth Control Movement and American Society Since 1830* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 202-210.
31. Walker, "The Growth of the Nation in Numbers," p. 3.
32. By the 1890s Walker had come to accept the notion that the Irish might have some racial potential, see "Immigration," pp. 131-132.
33. Francis A. Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," *Atlantic Monthly* 77 (1896): 828.
34. Francis A. Walker, "The Labor Problem of Today," address delivered before the Alumni Association of Lehigh University, 22 June 1887 (New York: Alumni Association of Lehigh University, 1887): 21, 23; "Immigration and Degradation," *Forum* 11 (1891): 634-644.
35. Walker, "Immigration and Degradation," p. 640-642.
36. According to Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," p. 824, the belief that "immigration constituted a net reinforcement of our population" was "so far as I am aware, held with absolute unanimity by our people." While most Americans viewed immigration favorably because it brought additional hands to tame the continent, some had expressed doubts. Benjamin Franklin in his 1751 "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind and the Peopling of Nations," *Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, Vol. 4, edited by Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 232, came close to paraphrasing Walker's theory: "The Importation of Foreigners into a Country that has as many Inhabitants as the present Employments and Provisions for Subsistence will bear; will be in the End no Increase of People; unless the New Comers have more industry and Frugality than the Natives, and then they will provide more Subsistence, and increase in the Country; but they will gradually eat the Natives out." Thomas Jefferson in his "Notes on Virginia," *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 2, edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), pp. 116-121, also argued that immigration doesn't increase final population size but only has a profound (and negative) impact on population composition. A common antislavery argument in colonial days was the negative impact slavery had on white immigration since white farmers would have to compete with slave labor, see David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 149. Finally, a nearly intact version of Walker's theory appeared in 1878, see M. J. Dee, "Chinese immigration," *North American Review* 127 (1878): 519-522. As Higham noted, *Strangers in the Land*, p. 360, there is no evidence that Walker drew on Dee's work as the source for his exposition.
37. Walker, "Immigration and Degradation," pp. 638-640, 643-644.

38. His text, *Political Economy*, 3rd edition (New York: Henry Holt, 1887), p. 310, contains a traditional "standard of living" explanation: "Within the past twenty-five years, the rate of natural increase in the North-eastern States has encountered a decided check, due to the rising standard of living in communities whose productive capabilities are already fully developed." There was no mention of immigration causing either a decline in the standard of living or a decline in fertility.
39. Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," pp. 824-825.
40. Walter Willcox, "Immigration into the United States, in *International Migration*, Vol. 2, edited by Walter Willcox (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931), pp. 93-103; and Warren Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1933), pp. 304-311.
41. Walker, "Our Population in 1900," p. 488-489, 494.
42. In 1889, while still advocating a "standard of living" explanation of fertility decline, Walker had analyzed the decline in accuracy of Watson's predictions in a most disparaging manner: "Quite as remarkable as was the fulfillment of his predictions during the early half of the century has been their failure in the latter half. In 1870 he was found to be 3.75 millions above the census enumeration; in 1880 6.25 millions above; while it is all but certain that his estimate for 1890 will be found 12 millions, and that for 1900, 20 millions, or more, in excess of the actual numbers"; see Walker, "The Growth of the Nation in Numbers," p. 3.
43. Tucker, *Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth*, pp. 89-105.
44. Oswald Ottendorfer, "Are Our Immigrants to Blame?," *Forum* 11 (1891): 544-545.
45. Francis A. Walker, "The Colored Race in the United States," *Forum* 11 (1891): 501-509. John Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1907), pp. 207-208, noted that "if Superintendent Walker's view is sound in all respects, the Southern white should shrink from competition with the negro in the same way that the Northern white shrinks from competition with the immigrant." Interestingly, when Commons found that "he does not do so," he still accepted Walker's theory. The fact that "the South has been remote from the struggle of modern competition" turned out to be reason enough for Commons to explain this incongruity.
46. John Billings, "The Diminishing Birth-Rate in the United States," *Forum* 15 (1893): 468-469, 474-476.
47. Most studies of the fertility of the children of immigrants found that it was higher than that of the children of native parents and lower than that of the foreign born; see Joseph A. Hill, "Comparative Fecundity of Women of Native and Foreign Parentage in the United States," *Publications of the American Statistical Association* 13 (1913): 583-604. Some implied that the children of the immigrants had lower fertility than even the children of native parents, see Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, pp. 203-204. In a recent analysis of the public use sample of the 1900 census Miriam King and Steven Ruggles found this to be the case, "American Immigration, Fertility, and Race Suicide at the Turn of the Century," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 20 (1990): 347-369.
48. See Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," pp. 825-826 for a description of successive waves of increasingly impoverished immigrant groups forcing down American wages. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, pp. 204-205, described how the "Irish race" currently was being "displaced by the Italians and Slavs" and was "resorting to the same race suicide which itself inflicted a generation or two earlier on the native colonial stock."
49. Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," p. 829.
50. Richmond Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration III," *Political Science Quarterly* 3 (1888): 416.
51. See Thorsten Veblen, "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 12 (1898): 373-397; and Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, pp. 125-133.
52. Walker, "The Labor Problem of Today," pp. 26-27.
53. See Sydney G. Fisher, "Has Immigration Increased Population?," *Popular Science Monthly* 48 (1895): 244-255; Frederick A. Bushee, "The Declining Birth Rate and Its Cause," *Popular Science Monthly* 63 (1903): 355-361; Prescott Farnsworth Hall, *Immigration* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1907), pp. 107-111; John R. Commons, "Amalgamation and Assimilation," *Chautauquan* 39 (1904): 217-227, and *Races and Immigrants in America*, pp. 198-208; Robert Hunter, "Immigration the Annihilator of Our Native Stock," *The Commons* (1904): 114-117; Henry Pratt Fairchild, "The Paradox of Immigration," *American Journal of Sociology* 17 (1911): 254-267, and *Immigration* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 215-231; Edward Alsworth Ross, *The Old World in the New* (New York: Century, 1913), pp. 300-304; and *Standing Room Only?* (New York: Century, 1927), pp. 318-325; James J. Davis, *Selective Immigration* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Scott-Mitchell Publishing, 1925), pp. 155-160; Roy L. Garis, *Immigration Restriction* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 219; Weld A. Rollins, "The Effect of Immigration on the Birth Rate of the Natives," *Journal of Heredity* 21 (1930): 387-402.
54. Walker was offered, but declined, the presidency of the Immigration Restriction League; he did become a vice-president of the League's National Committee. John Fiske, the Teutonist, became the League's first president.

55. Prescott Farnsworth Hall, "Selection of Immigration," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 19 (1904): 182.
56. Robert DeCourcy Ward, "The Restriction of Immigration," *North American Review* 179 (1904): 236.
57. "For a case like this I can find no words so apt as 'race suicide.' There is no bloodshed, no violence, no assault of the race that waxes upon the race that wanes. The higher race quietly and unobtrusively eliminates itself rather than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off by collective action. The working classes gradually delay marriage and restrict the size of the family as the opportunities hitherto reserved for their children are eagerly snapped up by the numerous progeny of the foreigner. The prudent, self-respecting natives first cease to expand, and then, as the struggle for existence grows sterner and the outlook for their children darker, they fail even to recruit their own numbers." See Edward Alsworth Ross, "The Causes of Race Superiority," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 18 (1901): 88. The Roosevelt quote comes from "A Letter from President Roosevelt on Race Suicide," *American Monthly Review of Reviews* 35 (1907): 550.
58. Quoted in Haller, *Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought*, p. 63.
59. See Haller, *Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought*, pp. 79-82, 144-159; and Kenneth M. Ludmerer, *Genetics and American Society* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 101-113.
60. Hall and Ward thought of renaming the Immigration Restriction League to "The Eugenics League," and they actually did direct the Immigration Committee of the Eugenics Section of the American Breeders Association.
61. Hall, "Selection of Immigration," p. 170.
62. Donald K. Pickens, *Eugenics and the Progressives* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) treats the reaction of the progressives to the eugenics movement. Marque-Luisa Miringoff, "The Impact of Population Policy upon Social Welfare," *Social Service Review* 54 (1980): 305-310, treats the adoption of hereditarian doctrines by early twentieth-century social welfare professionals.
63. Richard Lewis Dugdale, *The Jukes* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1877); Henry H. Goddard, *The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-mindedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1912).
64. Quotes are from Margaret Sanger, "The Function of Sterilization," *Birth Control Review* 10 (1926): 299. For a treatment of Sanger's shift from socialism to biologic Malthusianism, see David Kennedy, *Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970): 108-126.
65. Robert Hunter, *Poverty* (New York: Macmillan, 1904), p. 315. Walker's contrast between the high quality immigrant of old and the inferior new immigrant is repeated by Edward T. Devine, *The Principles of Relief* (New York: Macmillan, 1920), pp. 162-168.
66. Fairchild, "The Paradox of Immigration," pp. 260-261.
67. The quote is from *Reports of the Immigration Commission*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 494. William S. Rossiter, *A Century of Population Growth* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909) attempted to disaggregate the 1900 white population into "native" and "foreign" groups. About half this volume is taken up with the task. This work became "a stock reference for the Nordic supremacists," see Margo Anderson, *The American Census: A Social History*, pp. 144-145.
68. Walter F. Willcox, *Proportion of Children in the United States*, Bulletin 22, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905); Walter F. Willcox, "The Change in the Proportion of Children in the United States and in the Birth-Rate in France During the 19th Century," *Publications of the American Statistical Association* 12 (1911): 490-499; E. A. Goldenweiser, "Walker's Theory of Immigration," *American Journal of Sociology* 18 (1912): 342-351; Isaac A. Hourwich, *Immigration and Labor: The Economic Aspects of European Immigration to the United States* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912). Hourwich (p. 221) obviously viewed Walker's theory as a key restrictionist tool since he devoted an entire chapter to a critique of "this theory, originated by Gen. Francis A. Walker, until lately held unchallenged [in] the field of economic and sociological discussion."
69. Articles on immigration written by social scientists for the popular press during the 1920s tended to be racially based apologies for restriction and often presented Walker's theory; see William A. Satariano "Immigration and the Popularization of Social Science," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 15 (1979): 310-320.
70. Harry H. Laughlin, *Eugenical Sterilization in the United States* (Chicago: Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922).
71. Edward W. Bemis, "Restriction of Immigration," and "The Distribution of Our Immigrants," *Andover Review* 9 (1888): 251-264, 587-596; Richmond Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration, I" *Political Science Quarterly* 3 (1888): 46-77.
72. Allan Chase extensively documents the accumulation of such evidence, *The Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism* (New York: Knopf, 1977).

73. This was true even of those specializing in population studies, such as Fairchild. For instance, Warren Thompson, originator of the theory of the demographic transition and one of the leading American demographers of the twentieth century, simply asserted Walker's theory in 1915: "It is a phenomenon very generally observed that where peoples of different standards of living, whose cultures are not too widely different, come into contact, those having lower standards of living supplant those having higher standards." He gave no actual examples or references. See his *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*, p. 159.
74. A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 205.
75. Thompson and Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States*, p. 308; William S. Rossiter, *Increase of Population in the United States 1910-1920*, Census Monographs, No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 100-101.
76. See Francis Walker, "The Tide of Economic Thought," *Publications of the American Economic Association* 6 (1891): 34; "Immigration," pp. 135-136; "Restriction of Immigration," pp. 826-828. Quote is from "Restriction of Immigration," p. 828.
77. Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, p. 79.
78. Restrictionists blamed the explosion in late nineteenth-century immigration on a fiendish coalition of steamship lines, railroad companies and large industrialists. This coalition searched the outlying areas of Europe, selling now-inexpensive passages to America and drumming up low-wage workers for the industrialists' factories. This class analysis pitted the interest of a tiny few (who were not generally from "established" families) against that of the mass of Americans. See Bemis, "Restriction of Immigration"; Walker, "Immigration and Degradation"; Hall, "Selection of Immigration"; Hunter, "Immigration the Annihilator of Our Native Stock"; Ward, "The Restriction of Immigration"; Fairchild, "The Restriction of Immigration."
79. Hall, "Selection of Immigration," p. 180.